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YOU SAY EMBARGO, I SAY BLOQUEO—A POLICY
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTING FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND SAFEGUARDING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CUBA
Marcia Narine Weldon∗
ABSTRACT
The United States is the only major industrialized nation that restricts
trade with Cuba. Although President Obama issued several executive orders
that have facilitated limited trade (and President Trump has scaled some
back), an embargo remains in place, and by law, Congress cannot lift it until,
among other things, the Cuban government commits to democratization and
human rights reform. Unfortunately, the Cuban and U.S. governments
fundamentally disagree on the definition of “human rights,” and neither side
has shown a willingness to compromise. Meanwhile, although some U.S.
investors clamor to join their European and Canadian counterparts in
expanding operations in Cuba, many have an understandable concern
regarding the rule of law and expropriation in a communist country. Bilateral
investment treaties aim to address those concerns.
After discussing the legal and political barriers to lifting the embargo, I
propose a partial solution to the stalemate on human rights, which will: (1)
facilitate foreign direct investment in Cuba; (2) protect investor interests
through a bilateral investment treaty; and (3) require an examination of
human rights impacts on the lives of Cuban citizens before investors can
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receive the protection of the treaty. Specifically, I recommend the inclusion of
human rights clauses in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investor-state
dispute mechanisms as a condition precedent to lifting the embargo. My
solution also requires “clean hands” so that investors seeking relief must
provide proof that their business interests have not exacerbated or been
complicit in human rights abuses, rebut claims from stakeholders that their
business interests have not exacerbated or been complicit in human rights
abuses, or both. Finally, I propose revisions to the 2016 U.S. National Action
Plan on Responsible Business Conduct to incorporate human rights
requirements in future BITs and other investment vehicles going forward.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he United States will continue to speak up on behalf of
democracy, including the right of the Cuban people to decide their
own future. We’ll speak out on behalf of universal human rights,
including freedom of speech, and assembly, and religion.
—President Barack Obama, March 21, 20161
How many countries comply with all 61 human rights? Do you
know? I do. None. None.
—President Raul Castro, March 22, 20162

Relations between the United States and Cuba have changed following
President Barack Obama’s announcement on December 17, 2014, to begin
normalization.3 American businesses have begun capitalizing on the Obama
administration’s frequent executive orders easing restrictions by exploring new
opportunities in an attempt to have a first-mover advantage when and if
Congress finally lifts the embargo.4 For example, Starwood Hotels operates a
hotel owned by the Cuban military;5 Airbnb’s fastest growing home sharing

1
Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,
WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 21, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/remarkspresident-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press.
2
Matt Spetalnick & Frank Jack Daniel, Obama Spars with Cuba’s Castro Over Human Rights in
Historic Visit, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-castro-idUSKCN0WN
0HQ.
3
See FACT SHEET: Charting a New Course on Cuba, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/fact-sheet-charting-new-coursecuba; see also Charting a New Course on Cuba, WHITE HOUSE (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba; Third Meeting of the Cuba-US Bilateral Commission Today,
CUBA BUS. REP. (May 16, 2016), http://www.cubabusinessreport.com/third-meeting-of-the-cuba-usbilateral-commission-today; Cuba’s Top Diplomat Assesses US-Cuba Progress, CUBA BUS. REP.
(May 17, 2016), http://www.cubabusinessreport.com/cubas-top-diplomat-assesses-us-cuba-progress/.
4
See generally Cuba: Providing Support for the Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 2286–91 (Jan. 16, 2015);
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 2291-302 (Jan. 16, 2015); Enhancing Support for the Cuban
People, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,898–904 (Sept. 21, 2015); Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,915–26
(Sept. 21, 2015); Cuba Licensing Policy Revisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 4580–86 (Jan. 27, 2016); Cuba: Revisions to
Licensing Exceptions and Licensing Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,972–74 (Mar. 16, 2016); Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,989–94 (Mar. 16, 2016). The Trump administration has announced that it will
pull back on some of the Obama administration’s executive orders, but at the time this article was written, the
formal rules had not been announced. However, the U.S. Department of State’s website indicates, “any further
improvements in the United States-Cuba relationship will depend entirely on the Cuban government’s
willingness to improve the lives of the Cuban people, including through promoting the rule of law, respecting
human rights, and taking concrete steps to foster political and economic freedoms.” Fact Sheet on Cuba
Policy, WHITE HOUSE, June 16, 2017, available at www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/06/16/fact-sheet-cubapolicy.
5
Cuba Starwood Hotel Details, STARWOOD HOTELS, http://www.starwoodhotels.com/corporate/
directory/hotels/caribbean/cu/detail.html?language=en_US (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); see Michael
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market ever is in Cuba;6 a JetBlue flight landed in Cuba on August 31, 2016,
with several more airlines offering direct flights to the island by the end of
2016;7 and U.S. cruise ships now sail to Cuba for the first time since the
1970s.8
Cuba, however, remains a communist nation with a human rights record
and policy stance roundly condemned by analysts, dissidents,9
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),10 the U.S. Department of State,11 and
several members of Congress.12 Although President Raul Castro has
Weissenstein, Here’s the Scoop on Cuba’s 1st US-Run Hotel in 50 Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 28, 2016),
https://apnews.com/14b3972313284640949d08f9ab23c5a8/heres-scoop-cubas-1st-us-run-hotel-50-years.
6
Tim Rogers, How Airbnb Piggybacked on a Communist Program to Make Cuba its Fastest Growing
Market Ever, SPLINTER NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), https://splinternews.com/how-airbnb-piggybacked-on-acommunist-program-to-make-c-1793855922; see Abha Bhattarai, Among the Hurdles the U.S. Hotels Face in
Cuba: A Booming Airbnb Presence, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
capitalbusiness/among-the-hurdles-us-hotels-face-in-cuba-a-booming-airbnb-presence/2016/07/04/1aac15be36ec-11e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.html; Abha Bhattarai, U.S. Hotels Interested in Expanding to Cuba Find
Airbnb Already Established There, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnbcuba-20160705-snap-story.html.
7
U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Approves U.S. Airlines to Begin Scheduled Service to Cuba, U.S.
DEP’T OF TRANSP. (June 10, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-transportation-secretaryfoxx-approves-us-airlines-begin-scheduled-service-cuba; see Mimi Whitefield, U.S. Clears 6 for Takeoff to
Cuba But Flights Won’t Start Right Away, MIAMI HERALD (June 10, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article83024922.html.
8
Daniel Bukszpan, First U.S. Cruise Ship Docks in Cuba Since 1978: Here’s What They Saw,
FORTUNE (May 2, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/02/carnival-fathom-cuba-cruise/; see Marc Frank,
Emotional Return as First U.S. Cruise in Decades Reaches Cuba, REUTERS (May 2, 2016), http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa/emotional-return-as-first-u-s-cruise-in-decades-reaches-cuba-idUSKCN0XT
175.
9
Cuba’s ‘Forgotten 51’ Prisoners of Conscience, VICTIMS OF COMMUNISM MEM’L FOUND.,
http://victimsofcommunism.org/cubas-forgotten-51-prisoners-of-conscience/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); see
Lourdes Rivery, As a Cuban Exile, Here is What I Think of Obama’s Visit to My Country, INDEPENDENT (Mar.
24, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/as-a-cuban-exile-here-is-what-i-think-of-obama-s-visit-to-mycountry-a6950301.html; Ana Quintana & Ricardo Pita, Obama’s Legacy Will Be Marked by His Silence on
Human Rights in Cuba, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 25, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/25/obamas-legacywill-be-marked-by-his-silence-on-human-rights-in-cuba/; Guillermo Martinez, Cuban Dissidents Criticize
Obama’s Trip to the Island, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-gmcoloped0303-20160304-column.html.
10
Cuba 2016/2017, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/report-cuba/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Cuba Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/
countries/americas/cuba (noting Amnesty’s support for lifting the U.S. embargo) (last visited Oct. 24, 2017);
Cuba Events of 2015, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/cuba (last
visited Oct. 24, 2017).
11
Cuba 2016 Human Rights Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/265790.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
12
See Press Release, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Congresswoman, Comments on Obama’s Legacy and
Cuba’s Human Rights Record (Apr. 13, 2016), available at https://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/
obama%E2%80%99s-legacy-castro-regime-dupe-cemented-state-department-admits-cuba%E2%80%99shuman-rights; Press Release, Mario Diaz-Balart, Congressman, Comments on Obama’s Trip to Cuba (Mar. 19,
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announced that he will step down from power in February 2018,13 President
Trump has significantly rolled back some of the Obama-era reforms and made
it clear that there will be no more movement on Cuba-U.S. relations without
human rights reform from Castro, in addition to the resolution of a number of
claims related to the confiscation of properties by the Castro regime in 1959.14
Other nations share the U.S. government’s concern with Cuba’s human
rights record. Nonetheless, eighteen European Union member states have
signed agreements to conduct business with Cuba,15 and many European
companies have joined Canadian firms by investing in joint ventures with the
Cuban government.16 In the past, the EU itself had historically maintained a
more restrictive trading stance—the Common Position—due to the same
human rights concerns shared by the U.S. government.17 In March 2016,
however, the EU announced a landmark Political Dialogue and Cooperation
Agreement (PDCA) with Cuba designed to increase the flow of foreign direct
investment.18
In this Article, I argue that, notwithstanding the Trump administration’s
pullback of his predecessor’s movement toward rapprochement, the United
States should follow the EU’s lead to spur reform in Cuba. To do so, I
advocate requiring human rights clauses in bilateral investment treaties (BITs)

2016), available at https://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/diaz-balart-instead-ofshaking-blood-stained-hands-of-cuban-peoples.
13
Damien Cave, Raúl Castro Says His New 5-year Term as Cuba’s President Will Be His Last, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/world/americas/raul-castro-to-step-down-ascubas-president-in-2018.html.
14
Frequently Asked Questions Related to Cuba, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf (last updated
Nov. 8, 2017); Treasury, Commerce, and State Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanction Rules, U.S. DEPT. OF
THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_fact_sheet_
11082017.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
15
A New Phase in EU-Cuba Relations, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV. BLOG (June 25, 2014),
https://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/25/a-new-phase-in-eu-cuba-relations/.
16
International Corporations Doing Business in Cuba, CUBA BUS. REP. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.
cubabusinessreport.com/international-corporations-doing-business-in-cuba/; see Alistair Macdonald, Canadian
Companies Operating in Cuba Prepare for Change, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/canadian-companies-operating-in-cuba-prepare-for-change-1418955005; Cuba EDC’s Position,
EXPORT DEV. CAN., http://www.edc.ca/EN/Country-Info/Pages/Cuba.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
17
1996 O.J. (L 322) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996E0697
&from=EN; see also A New Phase in EU-Cuba Relations, supra note 15.
18
EU-CUBA Negotiations Towards a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, EUR. UNION
EXTERNAL ACTION, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)
607278 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
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and investor-state dispute mechanisms19 as a condition precedent to Congress’s
lifting of the embargo. Specifically, I recommend that any eventual BIT
between Cuba and the United States contains: (1) human rights language from
treaties and instruments that both nations have ratified; (2) a “clean hands
doctrine” that dictates admissibility of investor claims so that perpetrators of
human rights abuses cannot receive BIT protections; and (3) investor-state
dispute resolution mechanisms that build in avenues for stakeholder access,
including NGOs and others who can attest to or provide credible evidence on
an investor’s human rights record.
The development of a Cuba-U.S. BIT provides the ideal opportunity for the
United States to impose appropriate human rights conditions.20 Indeed, many
other states have included investment-related human rights provisions in their
National Action Plans (NAPs) related to corporate responsibility to respect
human rights.21 The United States, which released its NAP in December 2016,
did not include such provisions and must therefore reconsider and revise its
policy to provide more robust measures to protect human rights in Cuba and
beyond.22
In addition, an appropriately drafted BIT may help allay investor concerns
because, despite the U.S. liberalization of trade rules, not everyone is rushing
to Cuba. Eager but wary investors have raised valid concerns about the rule of
law,23 given the realities of doing business with state-owned enterprises24 as

19
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds (last visited Oct.
24, 2017).
20
Cuba’s human rights violations have been well documented, including forced detentions of political
dissidents and restrictions on freedom of assembly and movement. See MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43926, CUBA: ISSUES AND ACTIONS IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 9-13 (2016); Cuba 2016/2017, supra
note 10; Cuba Events of 2015, supra note 10. Notwithstanding those critical issues, I will focus on labor rights,
specifically those International Labour Organization rights that Cuba purports to support. See Cuba 2016
Human Rights Report, supra note 11.
21
Study on Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, at 21 (Feb. 2,
2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.
pdf.
22
See infra Part IV.
23
For the purposes of this Article, rule of law “consists of procedures giving all people in a society
meaningful access to justice, unimpeded by corruption or discrimination.” See Mark P. Lagon, A Global Trust
for Rule of Law Policy Innovation Memorandum No.26, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.
org/rule-of-law/global-trust-rule-law/p29170 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). See generally K. M. Paparelli,
Reforming Foreign Investment Law in Cuba (Oct. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
24
See Marcia Narine, The Cuban Conundrum: Corporate Governance and Compliance Challenges for
U.S. Publicly-Traded Companies, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 865, 869–72 (2016).
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well as legitimate concerns about nationalization of foreign assets and contract
enforcement.
Although investors raise concerns about the rule of law and the loss of their
assets as a violation of their rights, they rarely acknowledge the potential
human rights violations that they themselves may commit, or even condone, as
passive bystanders to governmental abuses.25 Other than those that tout
corporate social responsibility, most businesses have no incentive to think
about the effects their activities have on the workers and citizens in the host
country.
Further, many businesses remain unaware that under the 2011 United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP or Guiding
Principles),26 which I will discuss in more detail in Part II, firms must respect
human rights and should provide non-judicial grievance mechanisms for
claims brought against them based upon their human rights violations.27
Although the UNGPs are not binding on businesses,28 a number of companies
have voluntarily adopted them.29 Additionally, many companies already have

25
See Jena Martin, What’s in a Name? Transnational Corporations as Bystanders Under International
Law, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (stating, “TNCs . . . with their vast economic multi-jurisdictional
influence, wield an enormous amount of power in the international social, economic, and legal arena. The rise
of their power and influence has coincided with their increased involvement in human rights-related issues.
And yet, TNCs consistently reject the notion of their active participation or complicity in these events. In
doing so, TNCs are labeling themselves ‘bystanders’ under international law.”).
26
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect,
Respect, and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, 17th Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, (Mar. 21,
2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
27
Id. at 24 (“States should provide effective and appropriate non-judicial grievance mechanisms,
alongside judicial mechanisms, as part of a comprehensive State-based system for the remedy of businessrelated human rights abuse.”).
28
Guiding Principles, supra note 26. However, in its General Principles, “[the] Guiding Principles
apply to all States and to all business enterprises, both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector,
location, ownership and structure.” Id. The Guiding Principles also provide that “[b]usiness enterprises should
respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” Id. at 13.
29
The Road from Principles to Practice: Today’s Challenges for Business in Respecting Human Rights,
UNIVERSAL RTS. GROUP, http://www.universal-rights.org/urg-policy-reports/the-road-from-principles-topractice-todays-challenges-for-business-in-respecting-human-rights/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). In May 2011,
Coca-Cola formally endorsed the draft UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 2012/2013
Sustainability Report, COCA-COLA COMPANY, http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/44/d4/e4eb8b6f4682804
bdf6ba2ca89b8/2012-2013-gri-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). Google has done the same, and its policy
states:

Google developed the following requirements for its suppliers (each a “Supplier”) based
on the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct (“EICC”) and
international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
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human rights policies or issue corporate social responsibility reports,30 and
those that do not have faced shareholder proposals or investor pressure on the
topic.31 Adding more urgency, the EU, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and a number of other regulatory bodies around the world
seek or require environmental, social, and governance disclosures.32
My proposal addresses both the UNGP’s corporate responsibility to respect
human rights and the duty to provide judicial and non-judicial access to
remedies. I would require firms to defend their human rights record in Cuba if
they wish to take advantage of favorable BIT provisions. The proposal further
provides some measure of access to remedy through the ability of stakeholders
to provide evidence to an arbitral panel to determine the admissibility of an
investor’s claim.
Private businesses may not focus on the UNGPs, but these UNGPs are
binding on states through treaty and customary international law.33 The
UNGPs can and should provide leverage through BIT clauses to incentivize
appropriate corporate behavior in Cuba and other nations.

Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Google’s
values.
Responsible Manufacturing, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/company/responsible-manufacturing.
html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
30
Human
Rights
Policy,
GAP
INC.,
http://www.gapinc.com/content/attachments/sersite/
HumanRightsPolicy_FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Labor and Human Rights: Workers’ Rights are
Human Rights, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Human
Rights, BP GLOBAL., http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/society/human-rights.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2017).
31
Nordstrom—Human Rights—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/
shareholder-proposal/nordstrom-human-rights-2016/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Shareholder Advocacy, AFLCIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/social-economic-justice/shareholder-advocacy (last visited Oct. 24,
2017); Marta Maretich, ESG Disclosure: Investors’ New Obsession, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/04/esg-disclosure-new-obsession-investors-businesses/.
32
See Improving Corporate Governance: Europe’s Largest Companies Will Have to Be More
Transparent About How They Operate, EUR. COMM’N (Apr. 15, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_STATEMENT-14-124_en.htm; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Dᴏᴄ Nᴏ. S7-06-16, at 204-215 (2016),
available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf.
33
Frequently Asked Questions About the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. OFF.
OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS. 1, 9 (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQ_
PrinciplesBussinessHR.pdf (“Protecting human rights against business-related abuse is expected of all States,
and in most cases is a legal obligation through their ratification of legally binding international human rights
treaties containing provisions to this effect. The State duty to protect in the Guiding Principles is derived from
these obligations.”).
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The UNGPs also provide support for states’ development of National
Action Plans34 to provide incentives and penalties for businesses operating at
home and abroad to respect human rights. Although the UNGPs do not require
NAPs, the U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights has
interpreted their requirement as a part of the UNGPs.35 The U.S. government
has released a NAP, but it does not go far enough.36 As the government looks
to reshape policy in Cuba, both pre- and post-embargo, my proposed additions
to the NAP will provide the United States with an opportunity to model
appropriate leadership in investment and BITs that can be applied to countries
other than Cuba.
Part I of this Article will discuss the law of the embargo. Part II will
address: (1) how Cuba and the United States differ on defining human rights,
(2) how that impasse impedes progress on lifting the embargo, (3) the human
rights records of both the United States and Cuba, and (4) the role of
transnational corporations in exacerbating human rights abuses. Part III will
focus on: (1) the rule of law concerns for investors, (2) the resolution of
commercial disputes with the Cuban government, and (3) the use of BITs to
encourage investment and allay fears in general. Part IV will build on recent
scholarship calling for human rights clauses in BITs.37 In Part IV, I contend
that the United States must add human rights standards for due diligence and
must allow access to remedy for the Cuban people to any potential BIT and
investor-state dispute mechanisms, and it should do so to comply with its
obligations to promulgate a National Action Plan.38 Part V will briefly
conclude with the legal and strategic implications for U.S. policymakers
working towards lifting the embargo. Despite the Castro regime’s slow pace of
internal reform and engagement with the United States, the Cuban government
will have to change tactics to promote additional investment.

34
State National Action Plans, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited on October 24, 2017).
35
Id. (“The UN Working Group strongly encourages all States to develop, enact and update a national
action plan on business and human rights as part of the State responsibility to disseminate and implement the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”).
36
U.S. National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/eppd/csr/naprbc/index.htm (last visited on Sept. 24, 2017).
37
See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment
Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 2003),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf; Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle DumasAubin, When and How Allegations of Human Rights Violations Can Be Raised in Investor-State Arbitration,
13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 349 (2012); Ursula Kriebaum, Aligning Human Rights And Investment Protection,
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (Jan. 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/tdm-v10-01.pdf.
38
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 19.
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A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. LAW GOVERNING BUSINESS
RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Lifting the U.S. embargo will not be an easy task because a number of
complex, interrelated laws prevent U.S. businesses and persons from
conducting business freely with Cuba. These laws exist notwithstanding near
constant formal, informal, and off-the-record negotiations between the United
States and Cuba since the revolution in 1959.39 Indeed, every U.S. president
from Eisenhower through Obama has made some effort to negotiate formally
or informally with the Castro government, often with these negotiations being
the most pressing when relations were most strained.40 Even President Trump,
who now opposes lifting the embargo, attempted to do business in Cuba prior
to entering politics.41
Both the Cuban government and the United Nations42 label the current
embargo as the “blockade” or “bloqueo,” reflecting their view that U.S.
policies have not only prohibited American43 companies from trading with the
island, but have also imposed an economic blockade preventing other countries
and companies from engaging in full trade.44 For example, U.S. law prohibits
the import of items with materials of Cuban origin.45 This means that a foreign
car that uses Cuban nickel cannot be imported into the United States even
though that foreign car company is itself not subject to the U.S. embargo. As
one commentator observed:
39
See generally MARC FRANK, CUBAN REVELATIONS: BEHIND THE SCENES IN HAVANA (2015) (written
from the perspective of a U.S. reporter living and working in Cuba and discussing, among other things, the
Cuban perspective on the embargo and sanctions regime as well as the internal legislative changes within
Cuba); WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE & PETER KORNNLUH, BACK CHANNEL TO CUBA: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HAVANA (2014) (using formerly classified documents and
interviews with participants to outline the series of negotiations and attempts to reach rapprochement);
Futures: Historical Perspectives, BILDNER CTR. FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE STUD. (June 17, 2011),
http://cubaproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/HistoricalPerspectivesWEB.pdf.
40
Charlotte England, All the US Presidents Fidel Castro Outlasted, and How They Dealt with the
Cuban Leader, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/fidel-castro-uspresidents-outlasted-and-how-they-dealt-with-him-eisenhower-kennedy-johnson-nixon-a7440486.html.
41
Marcy Kreiter, A Trump Casino in Cuba? Donald Trump Reportedly Explored Doing Business in
Cuba in Violation of US Policy, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.com/trump-casinocuba-donald-trump-reportedly-explored-doing-business-cuba-violation-us-2424258.
42
Press Release, General Assembly, As General Assembly Demands End to Cuba Blockade for
Twenty-Third Consecutive Year, Country’s Foreign Minister Cites Losses Exceeding $1 Trillion, U.N. Press
Release GA/11574 (Oct. 28, 2014).
43
For the purposes of this Article, “American” refers to the United States and not the Americas
generally. Canada and countries in Central and South America have traded freely with Cuba for decades.
44
See, e.g., Joy Gordon, El Bloqueo: The Cuban Embargo Continues, HARPER’S MAG. (July 2016),
http://harpers.org/archive/2016/07/el-bloqueo/.
45
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.204 (2009).
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In the American imagination, the embargo serves mostly to deny us
access to Cohibas and Havana Club rum, but its damage to the Cuban
people has been, and continues to be, pervasive and profound. It
affects their access to everything from electricity to video games to
shoes. It has prevented Cubans from buying medical supplies from
American companies, from buying pesticides and fertilizer, from
purchasing Microsoft Word or downloading Adobe Acrobat. It has
restricted how much money Cuban Americans can send to their
families on the island. Americans have been prosecuted for selling
water-treatment supplies to Cuba and threatened with prosecution for
donating musical instruments.46

In fact, the United States stands alone in isolating Cuba.47 Indeed, every
year for almost a quarter century, the U.N. General Assembly has called for an
end to the embargo through a resolution.48 Every year for the past several
years, only the United States and Israel have voted against the resolution,
including in 2015 after normalization efforts commenced.49 In 2016, for the
first time, the United States abstained from the vote condemning its own
embargo, and Israel joined in that abstention.50 The United States under the
Trump administration returned to the tradition of voting against the
resolution.51
Despite the U.S. government’s softened stance under President Obama
(which will likely harden again under President Trump), several U.S. laws still
require sanctions on Cuba, ranging from the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917 to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.52
The most important of these laws is the Helms-Burton Act or LIBERTAD,

46

Gordon, supra note 44.
Lee Edwards, Why We Isolated Cuba for 53 Years, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://dailysignal.com/2014/12/18/isolated-cuba-53-years/.
48
Merrit Kennedy, For First Time, U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution Criticizing Cuba Embargo, NPR
(Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/26/499469386/for-first-time-u-s-abstainson-u-n-resolution-condemning-cuba-embargo.
49
UN General Assembly Renews Long-Standing Call for End to US Embargo Against Cuba, U.N.
NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52391#.V5N7SpODFBc.
50
Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, U.S. Abstains in U.N. Vote Condemning Cuba Embargo, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/americas/united-nations-cuba-embargo.
html; Giovanna Maselli, US, Israel Abstain from U.N Vote on Cuba Embargo, CBSMIAMI (Oct. 26, 2016),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2016/10/26/u-s-abstains-from-u-n-vote-on-cuba-embargo/.
51
Rick Gladstone, Trump Administration Defends Cuba Embargo at U.N., Reversing Obama, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/americas/cuba-un-us-embargo.html?_r=0.
52
Alan Dunn & Sahar Hafeez, U.S.-Cuba Related Sanctions Update and Overview: Obama
Administration Further Eases Cuba Sanctions Against the Backdrop of Strict Statutory Restrictions, STEWART
L. (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.stewartlaw.com/Article/ViewArticle/1082.
47
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enacted in 1996.53 This patchwork of laws gives the executive branch latitude
in enforcing them but still prevents any president from unilaterally lifting the
embargo all at once.54 I will briefly discuss these laws below in chronological
order.55
A. Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) (1917)
The Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), first implemented under
Woodrow Wilson’s administration during World War I, authorizes the
President, in times of national emergency, to impose embargoes on
transactions between the United States and targeted countries.56 It also
provides the President the power to put in place and maintain economic
sanctions against hostile nations.57 In October 1960, President Eisenhower
invoked the TWEA in response to the nationalization of U.S. companies in
Cuba.58 Under this law, U.S. companies cannot export anything to Cuba other
than food and medicine—although some of these rules have been liberalized as
discussed.59 Ironically, considering the normalization efforts, President Obama
reauthorized Cuba’s listing on the TWEA because this allowed him to continue
to use his executive authority to improve ties with the communist country.60
Thus, notwithstanding Obama’s former overtures toward the island, Cuba and
the United States are still formally “enemies.”61

53
DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43888, CUBA SANCTIONS:
LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS LIMITING THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS (2017).
54
Id.
55
See generally id.
56
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4341 (2011); Laura A. Michalec, Trade
with Cuba Under the Trading with the Enemy Act: A Free Flow of Ideas and Information?, 15 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 808 (1991); see also Exec. Order No. 2729-A (Oct. 12, 1917), transcript available at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75446.
57
Peter Schroeder, Can Obama Lift Cuba Embargo Alone?, THE HILL (Dec. 17, 2014), http://thehill.
com/policy/finance/227442-can-obama-lift-cuba-embargo-without-congress.
58
U.S. Foreign Policy Sanctions: Cuba, USA ENGAGE (Sept. 19, 2017), http://usaengage.org/Issues/
Sanctions-Programs/Cuba/.
59
Cuban Import Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201-515.801 (1962); U.S. Foreign Policy Sanctions:
Cuba, supra note 58.
60
Taylor Wofford, Obama Extends Cuba’s Designation Under Trading with the Enemy Act,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/cubatradingwithenemyactextension-obama-castro371978.
61
Serena Marshall, President Obama Reauthorizes Cuba Listing on ‘Trading with the Enemy Act’,
ABC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-reauthorizes-cuba-listingtrading-enemy-act/story?id=33690036.
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B. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (1961)
In September 1961, President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (FAA), which authorized a total embargo on trade with Cuba.62 The
FAA had an extraterritorial reach, banning transport of U.S. goods on ships
owned by companies that do business with Cuba and prohibiting foreign
assistance to countries providing assistance to Cuba.63 Although the FAA
provides that the embargo is discretionary, LIBERTAD, discussed below, only
allows suspension of the embargo if the President determines that Cuba has a
transition government in power and a democratically elected government.64
C. Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) (1963)
President Kennedy issued an executive order prohibiting travel to Cuba and
all financial and commercial transactions with Cuba in 1963.65 Through this
comprehensive act, the Treasury Department, using the authority of the TWEA
and the FAA, prohibited most financial transactions with Cuba and also froze
the Cuban government’s assets in the United States.66 This legislation is
frequently amended but is still the main source of embargo law today.67 The
Office of Foreign Asset Control and the Bureau of Industry and Security
govern the administration of this complex set of regulations.68
D. Cuba Democracy Act (CDA) (1992)
The codification of Cuba sanctions, which had thus far been largely based
on executive orders, began in October 1992, when President Bush signed the

62

Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 3, 1962).
U.S. Foreign Policy Sanctions: Cuba, supra note 58.
64
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act 22 U.S.C §§ 6021–6091 (2016).
65
U.S. Foreign Policy Sanctions: Cuba, supra note 58.
66
Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 28 Fed. Reg. 6974–85 (1963).
67
CACR regulations have been amended on January 16, 2015; September 21, 2015; January 27, 2016;
and March 16, 2016. See Cuba: Providing Support for the Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 2286–91 (Jan. 16,
2015); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 2291-302 (Jan. 16, 2015); Enhancing Support for the
Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,898–904 (Sept. 21, 2015); Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 80 Fed. Reg.
56,915–26 (Sept. 21, 2015); Cuba: Revisions to Licensing Exceptions and Licensing Policy, 81 Fed. Reg.
13,972–74 (Mar. 16, 2016); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,989–94 (Mar. 16, 2016); see
SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 27.
68
Embargoes and Other Special Controls: Cuba, 15 C.F.R. § 746.2 (2016); Exportations from the
United States to Cuba, 31 C.F.R. § 515.533 (2016); see also 81 Fed. Reg. 13,989 (Mar. 16, 2016); Resource
Center, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/
cuba.aspx (last updated Jan. 24, 2017); Frequently Asked Questions Related To Cuba, U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf (last
updated Jan. 6, 2017).
63
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Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), also known as the Torricelli Act.69 The CDA
includes provisions that: (1) prohibit foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S.
companies from trading with Cuba, (2) require the interning of foreign flag
ships traveling from Cuba, (3) prohibit travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens, and (4)
restrict family remittances to Cuba.70 The President has the discretion to waive
some, but not all, of the provisions of the CDA, with the Helms-Burton Act
limiting much of that discretion.71
Of note, relevant portions of §6002 of the CDA state:
It should be the policy of the United States – (1) to seek a peaceful
transition to democracy and a resumption of economic growth in
Cuba through the careful application of sanctions directed at the
Castro government and support for the Cuban people . . . (3) to make
clear to other countries that, in determining its relations with them,
the United States will take into account their willingness to cooperate
in such a policy . . . (5) to continue vigorously to oppose the human
rights violations of the Castro regime; (6) to maintain sanctions on
the Castro regime so long as it continues to refuse to move toward
democratization and greater respect for human rights; (7) to be
prepared to reduce the sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in
response to positive developments in Cuba; (8) to encourage free and
fair elections to determine Cuba’s political future; (9) to request the
speedy termination of any military or technical assistance, subsidies,
or other forms of assistance to the Government of Cuba from the
government of any other country.72

Clause 3 in particular has provided ammunition for the Cuban government to
claim that the United States has interfered with the Cuban government’s ability
to trade with other nations.73
Under § 6007 of the CDA, the President can take steps to end the embargo
only if Cuba: (1) “has held free and fair elections;” (2) allows “for political
opposition and monitors;” (3) shows “respect for the basic civil liberties and
human rights of the citizens of Cuba;” and (4) is “moving toward establishing a
free market economic system.”74 This provision serves as one of the major
hurdles to negotiations between the two states because Cuba believes the
69
The US Embargo Against Cuba, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/
amr250072009eng.pdf.
70
22 U.S.C. § 6001 (2010).
71
RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra note 53.
72
22 U.S.C. § 6001 (2010) (emphasis added).
73
Id.
74
22 U.S.C. § 6007(a)–(b) (2010).
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United States is interfering with its internal affairs by requiring a change in the
form of government and by defining human rights in a manner that is
incompatible with communist ideals. I will discuss these differing definitions
for human rights in Part II.
E. Helms-Burton Act/LIBERTAD (1996)
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
also known as the Helms-Burton Act, officially codified the U.S. embargo
against Cuba. 75 President Clinton signed the legislation less than a month after
Cuban air force jets shot down two American planes over international
waters—killing four Cuban exiles.76 LIBERTAD is a mixture of previously
existing economic sanctions, policies related to restoration of democracy in
Cuba, threats against third parties that do business with Cuba, and restrictions
on entry into the United States by persons who “traffic in confiscated property”
or who are affiliated with such persons by ownership, employment, or
family.77 At a higher level, LIBERTAD outlines U.S. policy and economic
assistance towards a future transition or democratic Cuban government.78 It
allows lawsuits in U.S. courts against foreign companies who invest in
businesses once owned by Americans or by Cubans now living in the United
States.79 Of note, as permitted by law, Presidents Bush, Clinton, and Obama
have suspended this clause for six-month intervals.80
Significantly, if the U.S. opposes a loan, § 6034 of LIBERTAD requires
the Secretary of the Treasury to withhold U.S. payments from international
financial institutions in the amount that the institutions have loaned money to
Cuba.81 The provision also directs the Secretary of the Treasury to require U.S.
executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose Cuba’s
admission.82 These institutions include the powerful International Monetary
Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank.83 Because of these
75

22 U.S.C §§ 6021–6091 (2016).
William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the Cuban and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Mar. 12, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=52531).
77
See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 419
(1996).
78
22 U.S.C §§ 6021–6091 (2016).
79
Joy Gordon, Cuba’s Entrepreneurial Socialism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1997, at 18-30,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/01/cubas-entrepreneurial-socialism/376758/.
80
SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 23.
81
22 U.S.C. § 6034 (2016).
82
Id.
83
Id.
76
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provisions, Cuba has largely depended on other nations for financing, and
many of those lenders have recently forgiven Cuba’s debts.84 Nonetheless,
LIBERTAD’s provisions provide additional support for the Cuban
government’s argument that the embargo is in fact a blockade.
Most importantly, LIBERTAD makes clear that Congress cannot lift the
embargo until the President makes a determination that a “democratically
elected government,” as defined in the Act, is in power in Cuba.85 LIBERTAD
also requires that the government makes “demonstrable progress in returning
to United States citizens . . . property taken by the Cuban government . . . on or
after January 1, 1959, or providing full compensation . . . in accordance with
international law standards and practices.”86 These confiscated properties
have been a key sticking point in negotiations between the United States and
Cuba,87 and almost eight billion dollars’ worth of claims, including interest, are
under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Claim Settlements Commission.88 Of all
of the laws discussed in this Article, LIBERTAD is the most important. By
signing this law, President Clinton gave up his right, and the right of all future
presidents, to unilaterally lift the embargo. The Trump administration has
made clear that settling the confiscated property claims is a top priority.89
F. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
In October 2000, President Clinton signed the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act (TSRA), which allowed sales of U.S. food and

84
In 2014, Russia wrote off ninety percent of Cuba’s debt to the former Soviet Union, and in 2015,
several nations entered into the Paris Club Agreement to forgive over seventy-five percent of Cuba’s debt. See
Andrey Ostroukh & José de Córdoba, Russia Writes Off Cuba Debt, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-writes-off-cuba-debt-1405083869; Jason Chow, Cuba Reaches Deal to
Pay $2.6 Billion in Arrears to Paris Club, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cubareaches-deal-to-pay-2-6-billion-in-arrears-to-paris-club-1449947319.
85
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-951R, U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA: RECENT REGULATORY
CHANGES AND POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL OR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS (2009); see also 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–
6091 (2016).
86
22 U.S.C. § 6066 (2016) (emphasis added).
87
See RICHARD E. FEINBERG, RECONCILING U.S. PROPERTY CLAIMS IN CUBA: TRANSFORMING TRAUMA
INTO OPPORTUNITY 2 (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/12/01-reconcilingus-property-claims-cuba-feinberg/reconciling-us-property-claims-in-cuba-feinberg.pdf. See generally Claims
Against Cuba–Lead Decisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE U.S.,
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba-lead-decisions (outlining opinions on early Cuba claims)
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
88
See Completed Programs-Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF
THE U.S., https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
89
Richard E. Feinberg & Ted Piccone, Here’s a Blueprint for a Trump-Castro Deal on Cuba, AM. Q.
(Dec. 8, 2016).
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medicine to Cuba (and all other sanctioned countries) but required that
commodities exported be paid for by cash in advance and financed by thirdcountry financial institutions.90 Given Cuba’s cash flow difficulties after the
fall of the Soviet Union and the current economic crises in Brazil and
Venezuela,91 its main trading partners, this law is virtually meaningless to
Cuba today. The TSRA also prohibits most tourist travel to Cuba.92 Americans
can only travel to Cuba if they meet an exception codified by law.93 Unlike
many of the other laws discussed above, the President does not have the
discretion to waive enforcement.94
Notwithstanding these obstacles, beginning in December 2014, President
Obama leveraged his executive powers to gradually weaken restrictions on
trade and travel, banking and financial institutions, physical presence, and
telecommunications.95 On April 14, 2015, President Obama also removed
Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism,96 a move that eliminates some
barriers to access to foreign capital.97 Even so, as this brief discussion of the
law of the embargo demonstrates, past presidents have placed significant
hurdles in the way of future presidents who may wish to lift the restrictions.
Thus, a president cannot lift the embargo alone, and one of the most critical
barriers is the United States’ insistence on human rights reform, which runs
through many of the laws discussed above. Accordingly, Part II examines how
90

U.S. Foreign Policy Sanctions: Cuba, supra note 58.
Marc Frank & Anthony Boadle, Rousseff’s Fall in Brazil Casts Cloud on Cuba, REUTERS (May 12,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-brazil-idUSKCN0Y32T7; see Victoria Burnett, Amid Grim
Economic Forecasts, Cubans Fear a Return to Darker Times, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/americas/cuba-economy-venezuela-power-cuts.html.
92
Traveling to Cuba, U.S. EMBASSY IN CUBA: U.S. CITIZEN SERVICES, https://cu.usembassy.gov/
traveling-to-cuba (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
93
Id.; see also Travel-Related Transactions To, From, and Within Cuba by Persons Subject to U.S.
Jurisdiction, 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2016).
94
RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra note 53, at 10.
95
See SULLIVAN, supra note 20 (listing congressional proposals and observing that “[t]he overall
embargo, however, remains in place, and can only be lifted with congressional action or if certain conditions in
Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place”). But see Kevin J. Fandl, Adios
Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 31–32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2789819 (arguing that the foreign affairs power,
including the powers relating to the embargo, is an executive function and that no Congressional approval is
required to life it).
96
State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dᴇᴘ’T OF Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2017); see also Arms Export Control Act § 40A, 22 U.S.C. § 2781 (2010); 80 Fed. Reg.
§ 30,319 (2015).
97
Randal C. Archibold & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Cuba to Be Removed from U.S. List of Nations That
Sponsor Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/americas/obamacuba-remove-from-state-terror-list.html.
91
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Cuba and the United States define human rights and compares their respective
human rights records.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS DILEMMA
A. How Do Cuba and the United States Define Human Rights? A Comparison
of Constitutions and Treaties
Because Congress has imposed a human rights requirement for lifting the
embargo, it is important to understand how both Cuba and the United States
define the term and why both nations have criticized each other for their
respective human rights records.98
According to the United Nations:
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our
nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, language, or any other status . . . Universal human rights are
often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties,
customary international law, general principles and other sources of
international law.99

The United Nations enshrined these rights in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in Paris following the end of World War II.100 The International Bill of
Rights is comprised of the UDHR, the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its two Optional Protocols.101 I will discuss
the ICESCR and the ICCPR separately below.
The International Bill of Human Rights broadly categorizes human rights
as either civil and political rights or economic, social, and cultural rights.102
Civil and political rights, codified in the ICCPR,103 include the rights to life,
98
Marjorie Cohn, Human Rights Hypocrisy: U.S. Criticizes Cuba, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marjorie-cohn/human-rights-hypocrisy-us_b_9493892.html.
99
What are Human Rights?, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
100
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
101
See Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (last visited on
Oct. 24, 2017).
102
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
103
See id.
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free expression, freedom of religion, fair trial, self-determination, as well as the
right to be free from torture, cruel treatment, and arbitrary detention.104 The
ICESCR contains the rights to education, social security, paid maternity leave,
equal pay, reduction of infant mortality, as well as the right to form and join
unions and strike.105 In 2008, Cuba signed both the ICCPR and ICESCR but
has failed to ratify either.106 The United States signed both treaties in 1997 but
has only adopted and ratified the ICCPR.107
Neither Cuba nor the United States must comply with the ICESCR because
neither of these countries has ratified it. In the United States, most of the
guarantees go unfulfilled, in part because human rights in this country stem
from the Constitution, which dictates what the government cannot do rather
than what the government can or must do.108 The Cuban Constitution, on the
other hand, has more positive rights, such as the affirmative right to gender
equality.109
Although it has not ratified the ICESCR, the Cuban government has used
legislative measures to enact many of its policy directives.110 Cuba, for
example, provides free education through college and free healthcare to its
citizens.111 Neither the “right” to education nor healthcare is guaranteed to all

104
FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/faqcovenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
105
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
106
Ratification Status for Cuba, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=44&Lang=EN (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
107
Reporting Status for United States of America, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS.,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=USA&Lang=EN (last
visited Oct. 24, 2017).
108
Ann M. Piccard, The United States’ Failure to Ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Must the Poor Be Always with Us?, 13 SCHOLAR 231, 238-39 (2010).
109
Keiko Rose, Gender Equality in Cuba: Constitutional Promises vs. Reality 1 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.
Int’l Immersion Program, Working Paper No. 11, 2015), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=international_immersion_program_papers.
110
International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS: TREATY
COLLECTION (Sept. 17, 2007), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter Treaty Collection]; ICESCR, supra note 105; Fiona Hill, Prevention
Better than Cure in Cuban Healthcare System, BBC, Dec. 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/health35073966; Quality Education Without Money, CBS NEWS (Aug. 13, 2001), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
quality-education-without-money.
111
Hill, supra note 110; see also Edward W. Champion & Stephan Morrissey, A Different Model—
Medical Care in Cuba, 368 Nᴇᴡ Eɴɢ. J. Mᴇᴅ. 297, 297 (2013); Quality Education Without Money, supra note
110; Latin Lessons: What Can We Learn from the World’s Most Ambitious Literacy Campaign?, INDEP.
(Nov. 7, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/latin-lessons-what-can-we-learn-fromthe-worldrsquos-most-ambitious-literacy-campaign-2124433.html.
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citizens in the United States, although public education is free through high
school.
Cuba also has a more family-friendly social welfare system than the United
States. Cuba has provided paid maternity leave since 1963, and has now
extended paid leave in some instances to fathers.112 Further, Cuba’s healthcare
system is generally well-regarded, and despite the island’s relative poverty,
Cuba has a lower infant mortality rate than the United States.113 On the other
hand, despite being first in the world in GDP, the United States is the only
wealthy nation in the world that does not provide paid maternity leave.114
While Cuba has made strides to minimize the gender gap, even the U.S.
government acknowledges that, despite federal laws, significant pay gaps
exist.115 Cuba has also had a social security pension system for its citizens
since the 1920s.116 As of late, however, many retirees have struggled in the
face of rising prices, a depressed Cuban economy, and the dual currency
system. 117 On the other hand, the social security system in the United States is
so notoriously underfunded that many people cannot afford to retire.118
The countries also differ significantly on other labor issues. Although
Cuba’s social welfare system may provide more basic benefits for its citizens,
112
Cuba to Women: Please Have More Babies, NBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/latino/cuba-women-please-have-more-babies-n236406; see also Debra Evenson, Cuba’s Maternity
Leave Extended to Fathers, But Few Dads Take It, MEDICC REVIEW http://www.medicc.org/publications/
medicc_review/0605/mr-features.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
113
Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 Live Births), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.DYN.IMRT.IN (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); The World Fact Book, Infant Mortality Rate, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
114
Maternity Leave: How America Is Failing Its Mothers, BROADLY (Mar. 8, 2016), https://broadly.vice.
com/en_us/video/maternity-leave-how-america-is-failing-its-mothers.
115
See generally Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Presidential Proclamation – National
Equal Pay Day, 2016 (Apr. 11, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/11/
presidential-proclamation-national-equal-pay-day-2016.
116
Lorenzo L. Pérez, The Pension System of Cuba: The Current Situation and Implications of
International Pension Reform Experiences for Addressing Cuba’s Problems, ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF THE
CUBAN ECON. (Nov. 30, 1998), http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v08-53perez.pdf.
117
Id.; David Strug, Cuba’s Retired Population Struggles with Economic Reform, NACLA (Nov. 10,
2014), http://nacla.org/news/2014/11/10/cuba%E2%80%99s-retired-population-struggles-economic-reforms;
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social Reforms: State and Market Roles,
Progress, Hurdles, Comparisons, Monitoring and Effects, FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS 10–11, 18–22
(Aug. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/cubaseconomicsocialreformsmesalago.
pdf.
118
Jamie Hopkins, Social Security Could Be in Worse Shape Than We Thought, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2015/02/18/social-security-could-be-in-worse-shape-than-wethought/#5e949eda75a6; Mitchell Hartman, Many Boomers Can’t Afford to Retire, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 3,
2015), https://www.marketplace.org/2015/08/03/economy/many-boomers-cant-afford-retire.
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the United States has a stronger record on labor rights. The United States
permits organized workers to strike under the National Labor Relations Act
(with some limitations).119 Cubans, however, have no legal right to strike and
have access to only one legally recognized trade union, the Communist partycontrolled CTC.120 The National Independent Workers’ Confederation of
Cuba, the National Independent Laborer Confederation of Cuba, and the
Unitarian Council of Workers of Cuba comprise the Independent Trade Union
Association of Cuba, created to replace the Coalition of Independent Unions of
Cuba.121 But because the Cuban government has not officially recognized these
organizations, members have reported harassment, infiltration by government
agents, and the inability to advocate effectively for workers.122 Thus, it appears
that even though neither nation has ratified the ICESCR, the United States has
provided more protection for workers’ rights than Cuba.
Although the United States has not ratified the ICESCR, it has ratified the
ICCPR.123 However, a 2014 U.N. report on U.S. compliance with the
ICCPR124 provides talking points for the Castro regime against the United
States and on its own human rights record. In its most recent observations of
U.S. progress, the United Nations recommended that the United States focus
on, among other things, remedying past human rights violations, especially
during combat; addressing racial disparities in the criminal justice system;
combatting and eliminating racial profiling; strengthening protections related
to the death penalty, particularly regarding racial bias; reviewing its
immigration detention policies; improving homelessness; and, most important
for the purposes of this Article, ending the administrative detention of
prisoners without charges or trial at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in
Cuba.125
In its response to the criticism related to Guantanamo, which Amnesty
International has called “emblematic of the gross human rights violations

119

The Right to Strike, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes (last visited on Sept. 24,

2017).
120

Cuba 2016 Human Rights Report, supra note 11, at 26.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Jimmy Carter, U.S. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CARTER CTR. (June 28, 1992),
https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1369.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); see Treaty Collection,
supra note 110, at 2.
124
U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United
States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014), available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fUSA%2fCO%2f4.
125
Id.
121
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perpetuated by the U.S. government in the name of terrorism,”126 the United
States reiterated then-President Obama’s commitment to closing Guantanamo
and outlined steps it had taken to transfer detainees and provide some measure
of due process.127 Under the Trump administration, however, Guantanamo is
likely to remain open and house more prisoners.128 Further, while the U.S.
government points to Cuba’s incarceration of dissidents, in 2015, the United
States had the largest incarcerated population of the world.129 Thirty-one states
continue to impose the death penalty, and seven of those states carried out
executions in 2014.130
Despite the United Nations’ criticism of the U.S. government’s treatment
of citizens at home and abroad, Cuba is not in the clear. Not only has Cuba
failed to ratify the ICCPR, it has a long list of vocal critics on its human rights
record.131 Upon signing the ICCPR, Cuba declared:
. . . it was the Revolution that enabled its people to enjoy the rights
set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the
United States and its policy of hostility and aggression against Cuba
constitute the most serious obstacle to the Cuban people’s enjoyment
of the rights set out in the Covenant. The rights protected under this
Covenant are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic and in
national legislation. The State’s policies and programs guarantee the
effective exercise and protection of these rights for all Cubans. With
respect to the scope and implementation of some of this international
instrument, Cuba will make such reservations or interpretative
declarations as it may deem appropriate.132

126
Guantánamo and Illegal Detention, AMNESTY INT’L, https://web.archive.org/web/20170209132922/
amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights/guantanamo (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
127
One-Year Follow-Up Response of the United States of America to Priority Recommendations of the
Human Rights Committee on its Fourth Periodic Report on Implementation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE U.S. 9–11 (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/242228.pdf.
128
See Rebecca Kheel, Gitmo Numbers Likely to Rise Under Trump, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/316215-gitmo-numbers-likely-to-rise.
129
United States: Events of 2015, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/countrychapters/united-states (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
130
Id.
131
Ratification Status for Cuba, supra note 106. See generally Cuba 2016 Human Rights Report, supra
note 11; Cuba: Events of 2015, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/
cuba (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
132
Martin Palous, Cuba and Human Rights Law, FLA. INT’L U. VÁCLAV HAVEL PROGRAM FOR HUM.
RTS. & DIPL. 1 (July 1, 2014), http://havel.fiu.edu/news/2014/cuba-and-human-rights-law-by-martinpalous/cuba-and-human-rights-law.pdf.
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Contrary to Cuba’s declarations, Cuba does not provide for freedom of
speech or assembly, nor does it provide freedom from arbitrary detention and
arrest.133 Cuba received a ninety-one out of one hundred—nine spots from the
bottom of the list—for freedom of the press in 2016.134 The government
controls almost all media, and only a quarter of Cubans use the Internet, with
only five percent having home access.135 Freedom of speech and the right to be
free from arbitrary arrest and detention are fundamental human rights
guaranteed by the UDHR, and as a member of the United Nations, the UDHR
is binding on Cuba.136 Neither Cuba nor the United States is perfect in regards
to guaranteeing human rights, although U.S. citizens clearly enjoy much
greater freedom.
Significantly, although the United States criticizes Cuba’s record on
human rights, the United States has failed to ratify several key international
human rights treaties,137 including:
1) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women138—ratified by 185 countries, including Cuba and all
other industrialized nations;139
2) the Convention on the Rights of the Child,140 which protects children
from physical and mental abuse and hazardous work—the United
States is only one of two nations in the world that has not signed it;141
3) the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,142 which allows
trials of individuals accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity—Cuba has not signed;143
133

Cuba: Events of 2015, supra note 131.
Compare Cuba—Country Report—Freedom of the Press 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/cuba (last visited Oct. 24, 2017), with United States—
Country Report—Freedom of the Press 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/2016/united-states (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (giving the U.S. a score of 21).
135
Josefina Salomon, Six Facts about Censorship in Cuba, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/six-facts-about-censorship-in-cuba/.
136
Cuba Signs Human Rights Pledges, BBC, Feb. 28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
7270179.stm; see also Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/member-states/.
137
See View the Ratification Status by Country or by Treaty, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, HUM.
RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
138
G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(Dec. 18, 1979).
139
Ratification Status for CEDAW - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.
140
G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).
141
Ratification Status for CRC - Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R
HUM. RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
134
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4) the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families;144
5) the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,145 which
Cuba has ratified;146 and
6) the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance,147 which states that it is a crime against
humanity when practiced in a widespread or systematic manner—
Cuba has ratified.148
Cuban President Raul Castro has made it clear that the two states’ differing
definitions and prioritization of human rights will be a significant sticking
point in negotiations. He has also emphatically stated that human rights
“should not be politicized” and that there are no greater rights than education
and health care.149 Because it is unlikely that Cuba’s stance on human rights
will change merely because of U.S. demands, the United States can, and
should, use another route to encourage human rights reform—trade and
transnational corporations.
In the section below, I will discuss the current level of accountability that
corporations bear for human rights. I will then outline how a bilateral
investment treaty can provide some level of human rights protections to
Cubans even though they will not personally be parties to the BIT.

142

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
Cuba, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. COURT, https://web.archive.org/web/20161019063648/http://
www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=43 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
144
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, Jul. 7, 2003, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.
145
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
146
Ratification Status for CRPD - Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. OFF. OF
THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (last
visited Oct. 24, 2017).
147
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20,
2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3.
148
Ratification Status for CED - Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
149
Stephen Rex Brown & Leonard Greene, President Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro Voice
Differences over Human Rights after Historic Havana Meeting, N.Y DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.
com/news/national/president-obama-meet-cuban-president-raul-castro-article-1.2571711 (last updated Mar.
22, 2016).
143
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B. Do Transnational Corporations Have Responsibilities for Human Rights?
Voluntary Codes and Soft Law Initiatives
Clearly, the state has an obligation to protect its citizens from human rights
violations, but what role should companies play in safeguarding human rights,
especially when (1) transnational corporations (TNCs) have no direct, positive
human rights obligations under international law,150 (2) no international
criminal court system has explicit and direct jurisdiction over corporations, and
(3) no provisions in treaties create international criminal courts for the
prosecution of corporations? 151
Absent a specific law in the home or host state, TNCs have no legal
obligation to improve or protect worker rights.152 Instead, corporations obligate
themselves through voluntary “soft” law initiatives such as corporate social
responsibility programs.153 Below, I discuss soft law principles because firms
and states are familiar with these principles, and many can co-exist with the
“clean hands doctrine” of a bilateral investment treaty, in addition to the
revised U.S. NAP discussed in Part IV.
Many firms burnish their reputations by purchasing membership in the
most important and widely regarded corporate social responsibility program—
the U.N. Global Compact (the Compact). The Compact is the world’s largest
150
Human Rights Council Res., U.N. Doc. A/8/5, at 1 (April 7, 2008) [hereinafter Ruggie Report]
(observing that “the international community is still in the early stages of adapting the human rights regime to
provide more effective protection to individuals and communities against corporate-related human rights
harm”); Eric De Brabandere, Non-State Actors and Human Rights: Corporate Responsibility and the Attempts
to Formalize the Role of Corporations as Participants in the International Legal System, in PARTICIPANTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 268–283 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011).
151
Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations, Confusion in the Courts, 6
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 306 (2008); Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The
Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 183-89 (2005); In Controversial Landmark Resolution,
Human Rights Council Takes First Step Toward Treaty on Transnational Corporations’ Human Rights
Obligations, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR. (July 15, 2014), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/07/15/in-controversiallandmark-resolution-human-rights-council-takes-first-step-toward-treaty-on-transnational-corporationshuman-rights-obligations/. There are currently two draft treaties pending that would bind businesses to human
rights obligations. Joe Zhang, Negotiations Kick Off on a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights,
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/11/26/negotiations-kickoff-on-a-binding-treaty-on-business-and-human-rights/. The Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group
for the Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises (TNCOBEs) has begun negotiations on a binding treaty on business and human rights. Id.
152
Marcia L. Narine, Living in a Material World — From Naming and Shaming to Knowing and
Showing, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 219-54
(2015).
153
De Brabandere, supra note 150, at 275.
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such initiative and focuses on ten principles related to human rights, labor, the
environment, and anti-corruption.154 As of 2017, the Compact had 12,000
participants, including 9,000 companies.155 Of note, the Compact lists Cuba as
one of the countries in the Americas served by its members.156 Indeed, many of
the Compact members operate in countries with similar human rights records
to Cuba, such as China.157
Another soft law initiative stems from the International Labour
Organization (ILO). For years, organized labor in the United States has pushed
for TNCs to agree to the principles in the ILO Tripartite Declaration
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.158 The ILO aims to
“promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance
social protection and strengthen dialogue on work-related issues.”159
In 2016, the United States was the largest single member state and donor of
the ILO and funded twenty-two percent of the organization’s expenses but had
only ratified fourteen of the ILO’s 189 conventions.160 This hardly set an
example for U.S.-based TNCs to do more than required in a country where
only 11.1% of employees are members of unions as of 2015.161 In contrast,

154
A New Era of Action and Impact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, available at http://unglobalcompact.org/
what-is-gc/strategy (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). The Ten Principles state that businesses should: (1) support
and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; (2) make sure that they are not complicit
in human rights abuses; (3) uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining; (4) eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labour; (5) effectively abolish child
labour; (6) eliminate discrimination in respect to employment and occupation; (7) support a precautionary
approach to environmental challenges; (8) undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental
responsibility; (9) encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies; and (10)
work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery. The Power of Principles, U.N.
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Oct. 24,
2017).
155
Our Participants, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants
(last visited on Oct. 24, 2017).
156
Global Compact Profile, BUSINESS.UN.ORG, https://business.un.org/en/entities/34 (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017).
157
See Ruggie Report, supra note 150.
158
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE
Declaration), ILO (5th ed. 2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf.
159
About the ILO, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2017).
160
The U.S.: A Leading Role in the ILO, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/washington/ilo-and-the-unitedstates/the-usa-leading-role-in-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
161
Economic News Release, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
(last updated Jan. 26, 2017); Ratifications for the United States, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
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notwithstanding the labor issues identified earlier, Cuba has ratified ninety ILO
Conventions and one protocol.162
Some companies also agree to the tenets of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(OECD Guidelines). These guidelines are voluntary principles for responsible
business conduct for participating governments and multinational enterprises
operating in, or from, adhering countries.163 The OECD Guidelines require,
among other things, risk-based due diligence within the supply chain and that
the employment section aligns with the ILO Tripartite Declaration.164
Aggrieved individuals may utilize grievance mechanisms established through
National Contact Points (NCPs).165 Research has not revealed any Cuban
citizen utilizing the NCPs in any country.
Introduced in 2010, after five years of multi-stakeholder meetings, ISO
26000 is another unenforceable, but important, industry best practice standard
related to Corporate Social Responsibility. Cuba participated in the
development of the standard and has indicated that it would develop a
corresponding national standard.166 ISO 26000 has many linkages with the
Compact because it addresses human rights, labor practices, community
involvement and development, fair operating practices, the environment, and
consumer issues.167
162
Ratifications for Cuba: Occupational Safety and Health, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_INSTRUMENT_SORT,P11200_COUNTRY_ID:2,102603#Occ
upational_safety_and_health (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
163
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD (2011), www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/
48004323.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines for MNE].
164
Id. The OECD partnered with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) in 2010 in an effort to make
sustainability reporting more mainstream and to give greater guidance to member organizations as well as to
corporations in the adhering countries that are not member organizations. See OECD-GRI Partnership to Help
Multinational Companies Operate Responsibly, OECD (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/
oecd-gripartnershiptohelpmultinationalcompaniesoperateresponsibly.htm.
165
National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
166
ISO 26000 Project Overview, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION 10, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_
26000_project_overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); see also The 2011 Survey of Post Publication
Activities Related to ISO 26000, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-socialresponsibility.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); ISO 26000 Country information, INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, http://iso26000.info/countries/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
167
UN Global Compact and International Standard ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility: An
Introduction to Linkages between UN Global Compact Principles and ISO 26000 Core Subjects, U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/UNGC_ISO_Final.pdf (last visited Oct.
24, 2017); see also ISO 26000—Social responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/
iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso26000.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (discussing the standards
and guidance on how businesses and organizations can do so responsibly).
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Many U.S.-based TNCs also state in their codes of conduct that they
adhere to the spirit (if not the letter) of the UDHR, drafted in part by the United
States,168 adopted by the U.N. in 1948, and adopted by Cuba in February
2008,169 shortly after Raul Castro ascended to the presidency.170 Other
companies that have a human rights component to their codes of conduct either
refer directly to the UDHR or use similar language.171
The most critical development in corporate accountability for human rights
came in 2011, when the U.N. Human Rights Council, of which Cuba was a
member, unanimously endorsed the adoption of the UNGPs.172 The UNGPs
were again voluntary and nonbinding but were generally praised as a step
forward by the business and intergovernmental community—including the
OECD, which adopted its recommendations and added a human rights
component to its own guidelines.173 Specifically, the UNGPs require
companies to develop a policy statement on human rights, based on
appropriate expertise, that outlines the responsibilities of employees, partners,
and other stakeholders.174 The policy must be embedded in operational policies
and procedures and must be approved at the most senior level of the
company.175 Companies must perform due diligence throughout their supply

168
Human Rights & The U.S., ADVOCATES FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/
human_rights_and_the_united_states (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
169
Cuba: Cuba Signs International Human Rights Agreements with the United Nations, U.S. LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2, 2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/cuba-cuba-signs-internationalhuman-rights-agreements-with-the-united-nations/.
170
Cuba Signs Human Rights Pledges, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7270179.stm (last
updated Feb. 28, 2008).
171
See, e.g., Corporate Social Responsibility Policy for AAM & Group Companies, ABERDEEN GRP.,
http://www.aberdeen-asset.com/pdfupload.nsf/631A812E68A81E7180256FB800384050/$file/groupcsr.pdf?
OpenElement (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Company Code of Basic Working Conditions and Human Rights,
BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/aboutus/culture/code.page (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Human Rights
Statement, COCA-COLA CO., http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/e9/c2/f1c4a6314f93bd7545fe43934621/
human_rights_statement.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
172
Study on Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note
21, at 8.
173
In 2011, the OECD amended the OECD Guidelines to adopt the Guidelines and add a human rights
section that is consistent. Guidelines for MNE, supra note 163, at ch. IV; see also Lene Wendland, Advisor on
Business and Human Rights, U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r Hum. Rts., Statement at OECD Roundtable on
Corporate Responsibility (June 29, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48365284.pdf); Larry Catá Backer, From
Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Principles for the
Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the Construction of Inter-Systemic
Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2012) (examining the Guiding
Principles as well as some of the vulnerabilities).
174
Guiding Principles, supra note 26, at 15.
175
Id.
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chains to assess both actual and potential impacts on human rights—based on
feedback from stakeholders—and must track and communicate their
performance frequently and publicly.176 Under the UNGPs, businesses should
integrate the findings from their assessments across their organizations and
address the findings by allocating the appropriate budget and oversight
depending upon whether the business has caused the impact directly or through
a business relationship.177 Finally, the UNGPs require the companies to
remedy their human rights impact by providing a legitimate, transparent,
accessible, predictable, and equitable mechanism to aggrieved individuals.178
Though laudable, these voluntary soft law regimes do not go far enough.
The lack of enforcement mechanisms means that firms have no incentive to do
more than necessary to appear socially responsible. Particularly, in developing
nations such as Cuba, some TNCs may take advantage of the fact that the host
state has lax or unenforced labor, freedom of association, and discrimination
laws, among others. In some nations, TNCs may provide the only employment
opportunities for local citizens outside of lucrative government jobs that may
only be available through patronage or familial connections. That is not likely
to be the case in Cuba, where a large number of citizens still work for the state
for an average official salary of twenty-five USD per month,179 and the
government takes ninety-two percent of workers’ pay from an international
employer.180 Further, some TNCs may take comfort in the fact that there are no
strong labor unions in Cuba and that it is illegal for workers to strike.181 This
may conflict with a number of the voluntary ethical codes that the firms have
endorsed.182
Accordingly, the U.S. government must provide the proper incentives and
penalties for its firms that choose to do business in Cuba through a BIT and its
own NAP. This is particularly important because the Cuban business model
176

Id. at 16-20.
Id. at 12.
178
Id. at 20.
179
See Mimi Whitefield, Study: Cubans Don’t Make Much, but It’s More than State Salaries Indicate,
MIAMI HERALD (July 12, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/
article89133407.html. Cubans who do not work for the government but instead are self-employed—the
cuentapropistas—can earn much more. Id.
180
Circles Robinson, Cuban Gov. to Keep 92% of Worker Salaries, HAVANA TIMES, http://www.
havanatimes.org/?p=107948 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
181
A List of What the Cuban People CAN NOT Do in Cuba, HAVANA JOURNAL (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://havanajournal.com/politics/entry/a-list-of-what-the-cuban-people-can-not-do-in-cuba/.
182
See generally Marcia Narine, Ten Ethics-Based Questions for U.S. Companies Seeking to Do
Business in Cuba, 1 COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE J. 1 (2015) (discussing potential conflicts with ethical codes and
norms).
177
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promotes joint ventures with the very state that has human rights issues. In Part
III, I will discuss how the Cuban government authorizes firms to conduct
business in Cuba, as well as concerns about enforcement of contracts and
dispute resolution when the Cuban government is a partner. Following that
discussion, I will focus on the call for human rights provisions in BITs with a
Cuba-specific proposal so that U.S. firms do not exacerbate human rights
abuses. Although the United States may have little credibility with the Cuban
government when it comes to human rights, my proposal could move towards
a change in that perception.
III. RULE OF LAW CONCERNS FOR U.S. INVESTORS
A. Doing Business in Cuba—Law 118
Although advocates and the U.S. government focus on human rights
violations in Cuba, investors have another major concern—the protection of
their assets. In 2014, Cuba attempted to address this concern while promoting
investment though a new foreign investment law183 permitting three modes of
international investment. Cuba outlines its specific needs in the Portfolio of
Opportunities for Foreign Investment.184 Like earlier Cuban investment laws,
the 2014 law known as Law 118 excludes foreign investment in healthcare,
education, and military ventures.185 Investors can only choose from
International Economic Association Contracts (IEA), which according to the
government includes, “among others, contracts for hotel management,
production or services, contracts to provide professional services, risk contracts
to explore non-renewable natural resources, for construction and agricultural

183
See Ley No. 118: Ley de la Inversión Extranjera [Foreign Investment Law Number 118], Gaceta
Oficial de la Republica de Cuba [Official Gazette of the Republic of Cuba] (Mar. 29, 2014), available at
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/2014/04/16/G_2014041609.pdf [hereinafter Law No. 118]; see also Daniel
Trotta, Cuba Approves Law Aimed at Attracting Foreign Investment, REUTERS, (Mar. 29, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/29/us-cuba-investment-idUSBREA2S0EJ20140329; Raul J. ValdesFauli, What Does the New Cuban Foreign Investment Act Mean?, FOX ROTHSCHILD, LLP (July 2014),
http://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/what-does-the-new-cuban-foreign-investment-act-mean/;
Larry
Catá Backer, The Cuban Communist Party at the Center of Political and Economic Reform: Current Status
and Future Reform, 8 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 71, 95 (2015) (citing Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina,
Cuba and the Construction of Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 679 (2010)) (discussing Law 118 in detail and the historical methods of foreign investment in
Cuba); Paparelli, supra note 23.
184
MINESTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA, CUBA: PORTFOLIO OF
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS (2016-17).
185
See Law No. 118, supra note 183.
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production;”186 joint enterprises between the state and foreign shareholders;
and full foreign capital companies.187
Law 118 caused excitement among the foreign investment community
initially, but even if Congress were to lift the embargo tomorrow, the Cuban
government will not likely license many U.S. full-foreign capital companies.
According to the Cuban government, fifty percent of foreign investment in
Cuba occurs through joint ventures, forty-five percent through IEAs, and just
five percent through full foreign capital companies.188 The U.S. government
has only approved one American company to operate as a full-foreign capital
company in Cuba as of the time of this writing. But after one year of
negotiations, the Cuban government failed to approve it.189
Accordingly, notwithstanding Law 118’s provisions for full-foreign capital
companies, most firms will still partner with the Cuban government in order to
conduct business in Cuba because the government almost never approves the
full-foreign capital companies. Indeed, most of the European and Canadian
companies doing business in Cuba are involved in joint ventures with the
Cuban government.190 In an effort to promote more joint ventures, the Cuban
government has recently relaxed some of its terms.191 The government, for

186

MINESTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA, supra note 145, at 1, 12.
Id.; Law No. 118, supra note 183. A joint venture is a “Cuban commercial company which adopts the
form of a corporation with registered shares in which one or more national investors and one or more foreign
investors participate as shareholders.” Id. ch. II, art. 2(h). An IEA is “an agreement between one or more
national investors and one or more foreign investors”; each party imparts its separate contributions, and each
party retains ownership of these separate contributions. Id. ch. II, art. 2(f), 15.1(d). A full-foreign capital
company is wholly owned by foreign investors and the Cuban government has no investment stake. Id. ch. II,
art. 2(g).
188
MINESTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA, supra note 185.
189
Susan Adams, The Unlikely Entrepreneurs Behind Cuba’s First U.S. Factory Since the Revolution,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestreptalks/2016/02/16/the-unlikely-entrepreneursbehind-cubas-first-u-s-factory-since-the-revolution/#6de203a75f18; Melissa Block, First U.S. Factory OK’d
For Cuba Aims To Plow A Path Into 21st Century, NPR: PARALLELS (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
sections/parallels/2016/02/22/467372666/first-u-s-factory-okd-for-cuba-aims-to-plow-path-into-the-21stcentury; Updated: After One-Year, Cuba Rejects Alabama-Based Cleber LLC Tractor Assembly Proposal,
CUBA TRADE BLOG, http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/11/1/after-one-year-cuba-rejects-alabama-basedcleber-llc-tractor-assembly-propsal (last updated Nov. 5, 2016).
190
University of Miami Study Examines the Plight of Workers in Cuba, FOUND. FOR HUM. RTS. IN CUBA,
http://www.fhrcuba.org/2012/12/university-of-miami-study-sponsored-by-fhrc-examines-the-plight-ofworkers-in-cuba/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Foreign Businesses Tread Carefully as Cuban Opens Up, FIN.
TIMES, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eb663b9a-a7b3-11e4-8e78-00144feab7de.html#axzz3iKhPDTFA (last
visited Oct. 24, 2017).
191
Foreign Investment in Cuba’s “Updating” of Its Economic Model, ASS’N STUD. CUBAN ECON. (Nov.
30, 2015), http://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/foreign-investment-in-cubas-updating-of-its-economicmodel/.
187
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example, recently allowed Unilever to have a sixty percent stake compared to
the typical forty-nine percent in traditional contracts.192
More importantly for investors, Law 118 promises greater protection
against expropriation, repatriation of dividends and profits free from taxes in
convertible currency, and to offer tax incentives, including reduced-profit tax,
exemption from income tax, and the elimination of the labor tax for most
companies.193 Despite these incentives, those doing business in Cuba must
recognize that their practices at home and in other host nations will not apply
in Cuba. For example, foreign companies employing Cuban workers cannot
legally pay them directly.194 Instead, they must pay a company controlled by
the Cuban government in the home currency, and the Cuban worker receives
payment in the Cuban peso, which has a much lower value.195 The Cuban
employee receives only eight percent of the employer’s desired wage due to a
law that allows the government to keep ninety-two percent of wages paid from
foreign firms.196 As previously discussed in Part II, Cuban employees cannot
strike or collectively bargain for their rights.197 This may pose internal
difficulties for firms with organized employees in other parts of the world.
B. Resolving Commercial Disputes under Law 118
Law 118 has specific dispute resolution provisions.198 Conflicts that arise
between the partners must be resolved in accordance with the parties’
contract.199 These conflicts include: any issues related to inactivity of the key
governing bodies; winding up, dissolution, and termination of joint ventures;
and execution of the contracts between the various modalities of foreign
investments. Alternatively, conflicts arising from execution of contracts
between the partners and a Cuban national must go before the Economic

192
The 2016 Outlook for Foreign Investors in Cuba, CUBA J. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://cubajournal.co/the2016-outlook-for-foreign-investors-in-cuba/.
193
Law No. 118, supra note 183, at arts. 3, 4.1, 9.1.; see Nahila Cortes, U.S.-Cuba Relations: What is
Next for U.S. Investors?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/15/us-cuba-relations-what-is-next-for-u-s-investors/.
194
Jose Maria Viñals Camallonga, Hiring Staff in Cuba—A Guide for the Foreign Investor, LUPICINIO
INT’L L. FIRM (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.lupicinio.com/en/hiring-staff-in-cuba-a-guide-for-the-foreigninvestor/.
195
University of Miami Study Examines the Plight of Workers in Cuba, supra note 190.
196
Robinson, supra note 180.
197
A List of What the Cuban People CAN NOT Do in Cuba, supra note 181.
198
Foreign Investment Act, 2014, (Cuba), http://www.cubadiplomatica.cu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
IsdG-CVp5To%3D&tabid=21894
199
Valdes-Fauli, supra note 183.
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Division of People’s Provincial Courts in Cuba.200 Conflicts arising between
partners in investments related to natural resources, public services, and public
works must go to the People’s Provincial Courts unless there are other
resolution mechanisms in the governing documents.201
Notably, Articles 60 and 61 of Law 118 also permit arbitration through the
Cuban Court of International Commercial Arbitration (CCACI), which Cuban
contract law favors as the default mechanism if the parties do not designate
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.202 CCACI is also the Cuban
representative of the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC)
International Court of Arbitration.203
Foreign investors concerned about arbitrating in Cuba or litigating in local
courts have other mechanisms to resolve disputes. For instance, Cuba joined
the New York Convention in 1974,204 and thus, investors may have their
disputes heard outside of Cuban courts or arbitral proceedings.205 The
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, for example, hears a number of
cases from Cuba because that provision appears in typical IEA and joint
venture contracts.206
Although arbitration provides more comfort to investors than the
uncertainty of litigation in a foreign land, many international investors prefer
the added protection of BITs that include an international arbitration
component. In the case of Cuba, investors may worry whether their properties
will be expropriated—given the past history with Castro’s seizure of business
interests during the Cuban Revolution—and whether they can collect on a
judgment from the Cuban government given the current economic climate.

200

Law No. 118, supra note 183, at art. 61; Cortes, supra note 193.
Law No. 118, supra note 183, at art. 61.
202
Miguel-Julian Mateos Cuesta, International Arbitration 2016: Cuba, CHAMBERS AND PARTNERS:
PRACTICE GUIDES, http://practiceguides.chambersandpartners.com/practice-guides/comparison/4/164/E394-O193-197-200-204-207-233-240-211-215-216-220-224- (last updated Oct. 21, 2016); K. M. Paparelli,
International Dispute Resolution in Cuba, 32 FLA. B.J., INT’L L. Q. 1 (2015); see Gustavo J. Membiela &
Román Ortega-Cowan, Cuba Disputes: The Arbitration Option, LATINVEX (Dec. 9, 2015), http://latinvex.com/
mobile/article.aspx?id=2443.
203
Cuesta, supra note 202, at §1.1.
204
Membiela & Ortega-Cowan, supra note 202 (discussing the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Convention, which
protects the ratification of foreign arbitral awards).
205
Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last
visited on Oct. 24, 2017).
206
Cuesta, supra note 202.
201
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Part IV below will discuss BITs in general and the practicalities and
obstacles of imposing human rights obligations in these treaties.
IV. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, NATIONAL ACTION PLANS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. A Brief Introduction to Bilateral Investment Treaties
BITs are agreements made between two sovereign nations in which the
country that seeks investment agrees to certain terms with the country that is
exporting capital through investors.207 The investors seek to mitigate economic
and political risks, and the contracting countries provide that assurance through
a BIT.208 No global legal regime governs agreements between states regarding
foreign direct investment.209 Instead, states have established bilateral or
multilateral agreements to protect their investors in host states.210
However, many human rights activists criticize BITs for providing
corporations substantial and substantive rights without any true obligations.211
Rather, the host and home states agree to protect the investor by allowing the
investor to sue the host state for failing to meet its obligations. Indeed, in most
BITs, arbitrators cannot hear a claim unless an investor brings it.212 To be
clear, the host country that signs the BIT generally cannot seek arbitration
against an investor. It is strictly a one-way street, although it does not have to
be.213

207
Helena Sprenger & Bouke Boersma, The Importance of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) When
Investing in Emerging Markets, ABA: BUS. L. TODAY, https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/03/
01_sprenger.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
208
See Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited on Oct. 24, 2017).
209
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Regulation of Foreign Investment, 2 INT’L SUSTAINABLE DEV. L., available at
http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c13/E6-67-03-04.pdf.
210
Expropriation—Investment Protection and Mitigating the Risks, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT,
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/30459/expropriation-investment-protection-andmitigating-the-risks (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
211
Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, How to Impose Human Rights Obligations on
Corporations Under Investment Treaties?, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY
569–598 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011-2012).
212
Id. at 573.
213
See Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis & Tara Van Ho, Integrating Human Rights into the Extractive Industries:
How Investment Contracts Can Achieve Protection, in NATURAL RESOURCES GRABBING: AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW PERSPECTIVE 225–244 (F. Romanin Jacur, A. Bonfanti, & F. Seatzu eds., 2015) (“Investment contracts
can initially make an explicit reference to the UN Guiding Principles or to human rights as a specific term.”).
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Many advocates have also criticized the BIT system because the actual
parties to the BIT—the states—do not always share power equally.214 Indeed,
over half of BITs are entered into between rich home states and poor host
states.215 Despite investors having no BIT obligations, they can enforce their
significant rights against these impoverished host states—which they
frequently do.216 Between 1990 and 2012, foreign firms sued ninety-four host
states under BIT provisions.217 According to one source, during that time,
investors filed 564 international arbitrations against 110 host states, often
resulting in awards against host states in the hundreds of millions of dollars.218
This power asymmetry between the host state and investors causes many to
question whether the investors have the far better end of the bargain. However,
many investors would not undertake the economic risks, political risks, or
both, without the assurance of a BIT. One observer notes:
[S]everal studies have examined the relationship between the rule of
law, investment treaties and economic development. The results of
these studies largely demonstrate that the three concepts are
necessarily intertwined. More specifically, investment treaties act as
signals of a state’s commitment to the rule of law, and when this is
combined with favourable economic conditions, and the presence of
strong rule of law institutions, then this provides the most suitable
environment for economic growth.219

BITs, therefore, aim to ensure the right “climate” for investors, even
though they are not signatories. These agreements typically contain: (1) a
preamble, which provides substantive and procedural context for the
agreement; (2) a description of the scope and coverage of the protected assets,
214
Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 131, 147 (2013).
215
Helen V. Milner, Symposium: The Regime of International Investment—Foreign Direct Investment,
Bilateral Investment Treaties, and Trade Agreements, 66 WORLD POL. 1, 4 (Jan. 2014), https://www.princeton.
edu/~hmilner/forthcoming%20papers/Milner%20(2014)%20Introduction%20-%20The%20Global%20
Economy,%20FDI,%20and%20the%20Regime%20for%20Investment.pdf.
216
Luke Eric Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the Role of Human
Rights Law within Investor-State Arbitration, RTS. & DEMOCRACY, https://business-humanrights.org/sites/
default/files/media/documents/human-rights-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-peterson-2009.pdf (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017).
217
Milner, supra note 215, at 5.
218
Cristina Bodea & Fangjin Ye, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT)s: The Global Investment Regime
and Human Rights (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Political Economy of International
Organizations).
219
René Gayle, Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Yardstick of The Rule Of Law? An Investigation of the
Correlation Between the Rule of Law and International Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 LATIN AM. J. INT’L
TRADE L. 481, 482 (2013).
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investments, and investors; (3) most-favored nation treatment so that foreign
investors do not experience discrimination compared to other domestic or
foreign investors; (4) performance standards; (5) fair and equitable standards
and full protection and security; (6) guarantees of investors’ property rights via
compensation for expropriation by the host state; and (7) an obligation to
provide for the free transfer, repatriation, conversion, and liquidation of profits,
earnings, and other funds.220
BITs also generally provide one or more of a number of arbitration options,
including: (1) the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), established so investors could directly enforce
their rights against host states, which has adjudicated the majority of these
types of disputes—significantly, Cuba is not a party of ICSID;221 (2) the U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which provides
harmonized procedural rules for parties to use during arbitration;222 and (3) the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), based in Paris, which generally
handles more private commercial than investor-state disputes.223
B. Cuban and U.S. BITs
The United States has signed fifty-eight BITs, most recently with Rwanda
in 2008.224 The Cuban government has signed nearly as many, although they
are not all in force; Cuba’s most recent BIT was with China in 2007.225 Cuban
BITs focus on the state’s prerogatives and do not internationalize national

220
Marie-France Houde, Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 143 (OECD 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/40072428.pdf; see also Peterson, supra note 216.
221
Peterson, supra note 216; see also About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); Membiela & OrtegaCowan, supra note 202.
222
Peterson, supra note 216; see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL:
BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (2013).
223
Peterson, supra note 216.
224
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Rwanda-U.S.,
Feb. 20, 2008, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-23 (2008); United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
225
Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx (last visited Oct.
24, 2017); see also Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic
of Cuba Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Cuba, Apr. 24,
1995, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/724.
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law.226 Instead, they generally focus on “(1) conditions for the approval of
foreign investments, (2) state treatment of foreign investors, (3) expropriation,
and (4) resolution of disputes between the foreign investor and the host
country.”227 Cuba is also a member of several multilateral trade agreements,
including the CARICOM-Cuba Agreement,228 the Cotonou Agreement,229 and
the Treaty Establishing the Latin American Integration Association.230 Due to
the embargo, Cuba and the United States do not have a BIT, thus this Article
will propose some terms and parameters for a potential agreement, with a focus
on human rights concerns—given that prerequisite for lifting the embargo.
C. Human Rights Provisions in BITs
BITs, which can exceed one hundred pages, generally do not discuss
human rights, even though they can clearly affect such rights.231 Businesses,
which may not see themselves as responsible for protecting human rights, have
no incentive to focus on this issue, and as previously stated, are beneficiaries
of, but not signatories to, the BITs. Further, BITs may have an adverse effect
on human rights because investors can sue states that have enacted laws that
benefit host-state citizens at the expense of the investor firms. As one article
notes:
BITs have the potential to negatively influence human rights
practices because they lock in legally enforceable conditions
attractive to investors, both retrospectively and into the future. The
lock-in effect of BITs can force the hand of the government to favor
multi-national corporations or foreign investors even at the cost of
violating the rights of their own citizenry. Retrospectively, many
developing countries compete for investment and trade on issues
226
Larry Catá Backer, Global Corporate Social Responsibility (GSCR) Standards with Cuban
Characteristics: What Normalization Means for Transnational Enterprise Activity in Cuba 3 (Coalition for
Peace & Ethics, Working Paper No. 1/12, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id
=2699855.
227
Charles P. Trumbull, IV & Matias Travieso-Diaz, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Prospects and Perils,
ASS’N FOR THE STUD. OF THE CUBAN ECON. (Nov. 30, 2002), http://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/
foreign-investment-in-cuba-prospects-and-perils.
228
Trade and Economic Co-Operation Agreement Between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and
the Government of the Republic of Cuba, July 5, 2000, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/2498 (omitting any mention of human rights, despite being 89 pages).
229
Cotonou Agreement, Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other
Part, June 23, 2000, O.J. L 317/3, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
2499 (mentioning “human rights” in some form twenty times).
230
Eugenia López-Jacoiste Díaz, The Latin American Integration Association, in LATIN AMERICAN AND
CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 (2015).
231
Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 211, at 569, 574.

WELDON GALLEY_PROOFS

38

11/20/2017 3:03 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

ranging from environmental regulations to labor standards and
welfare spending and tend to be destinations of vertical investment
seeking cost efficiencies. . . . In addition, BIT provisions constrain
future policies, from the provision of welfare benefits, basic
infrastructure and investment in environmentally friendly
technologies to land reform. Locked-in low standards for
environmental protection or labor rights and constrained policies are
important sources of popular grievance in host states. The literature
on the causes of repression suggests that human rights violations are
key responses of states to the manifested or just anticipated protest
that can result[] from these grievances.232

The authors studied 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 and found
that the countries that had ratified the most BITs also had the worst human
rights records—particularly in a non-democratic regime.233
More importantly, for the purposes of this Article, ordinary citizens have
no recourse from BITs and other investment treaties. For example, one of the
biggest concerns with the Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty (TPP) was that the
investor-state dispute resolution mechanism provided no relief for workers,
communities, or other stakeholders that were not direct parties to the
agreement.234 This criticism makes sense. For obvious reasons, it is unlikely
that host governments will sue their corporate partners—firms that may
provide significant tax revenue—over a human rights grievance. Although the
TPP did allow for public participation and public grievances with amicus
participation, critics argued that such a remedy falls short.235 Under the TPP,
the tribunal must consult with the parties about amicus submissions and can
only accept submissions that relate to “a matter of fact or law within the scope
of the dispute.”236
Despite its flaws and the withdrawal from the TPP by President Trump,237
the TPP has some provisions worth salvaging. Therefore, I recommend that the
Cuba-U.S. BIT adopt the amicus submission process, but I would not require
that the briefs relate to the scope of the dispute. Rather, as I discuss later, the
232

Bodea & Ye, supra note 218, at 2.
Id.
234
Lance Compa, How to Make the Trans-Pacific Partnership Work for Workers and Communities, THE
NATION (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-make-the-trans-pacific-partnership-workfor-workers-and-communities/.
235
Id.
236
Ko-Yung Tung, Investor-State Dispute Settlement under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23 CAL.
INT’L L.J. 19, 22 (2015).
237
Trump Executive Order Pulls Out of TPP Trade Deal, BBC (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-38721056.
233
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tribunal should accept amicus submissions that relate to the investor’s human
rights record in Cuba to determine whether to admit the case at all. The 2012
U.S. Model BIT also allows tribunals to accept amicus submissions.238
Unfortunately, most countries’ model BITs—including those of the United
States, Germany, France, India, China and the United Kingdom—do not
specifically mandate human rights protections at all.239 The closest that some
BITs come to addressing human rights and the environment is the inclusion of
the following boilerplate language:
(c) Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner, and provided that such measures do not
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investments
. . . [BITs] shall not be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or
maintaining measures, including environmental measures: (ii)
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;240

Fortunately, some treaties go further than the language above or the
unenforceable reference to human rights that may be tucked into the preamble.
The ACP-E.U. Partnership Agreement, also known as the Cotonou Agreement,
frames the EU’s relationship with seventy-nine countries from Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific Region.241 The Cotonou Agreement mentions
human rights twenty times.242 Notably, Cuba is covered by the agreement but
did not sign it.243

238
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Sec. B, Art. 28(3),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
239
Bodea & Ye, supra note 218, at 7–8.
240
See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2693 (first entered into force between El Salvador
and the United States on March 1, 2006) (emphasis added); Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of
Korea and the United States of America, S. Kor.-U.S., Mar. 15, 2012, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2542; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Rwanda-U.S., Feb. 19, 2008, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2241;
United
States-Colombia
Trade
Promotion
Agreement,
Colom.-U.S.,
May
15,
2012,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2737; United States-Panama Trade Promotion
Agreement, Pan.-U.S., Oct. 31, 2012, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/2535; United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., Feb. 1, 2009, available at
http://tcc.export.gov/static/PeruTPA_chap10Investment.pdf; see also North American Free Trade Agreement,
32 I.L.M 289 and 605 (1993) (containing similar language).
241
ACP—The Cotonou Agreement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africancaribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
242
Cotonou Agreement, supra note 229.
243
Id.
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D. What Human Rights Provisions Should Be in BITs?
Some commentators244 recommend that, at a minimum, BITs should
incorporate the principles espoused in the UDHR245 (ratified by both Cuba and
the United States); the ICCPR246 (signed and ratified by the United States, but
not ratified by Cuba); the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (a soft law instrument, but nonetheless binding on ILO member
states);247 the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (ratified by both
Cuba and the United States);248 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (ratified by both Cuba and the United States).249 Some consider
these treaties optimal because they focus on both human rights and core labor
rights, including the freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and prohibitions against discrimination, forced child labor, and
bonded labor.250 They are also widely ratified treaties and instruments that
corporations have used as guiding principles for their own codes of conduct.251
The United States has ratified all of the aforementioned instruments, but as
discussed in Part II, Cuba has failed to ratify the ICCPR, which contains many
of the core human rights.252 Cuba will not likely agree to many of these terms,
given the two countries’ differing views on human rights.253
For this reason, the United States should focus on investor conduct and the
leverage that the United States will have in drafting the BIT with Cuba. I
recommend that the Cuba-U.S. BIT refer to the instruments that both states
have ratified, as well as the core principles in the Global Compact and the
244

Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 211, at 582.
Id.; see UDHR, supra note 100.
246
ICCPR, supra note 102.
247
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted on June 18, 1998, available at
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—en/index.htm. (reflecting the agreement of
the International Labour Conference on terms of fundamental work rights).
248
GA Res. 58/4, U.N. Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003).
249
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_
of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2017). The convention was adopted by consensus at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development by 178 countries in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in
June 1992. Id.
250
Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 211, at 581. The authors recognize that BITs could also
reference the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or the UN Global Compact but argue that States
are unlikely to convert these soft law instruments into binding law. Id. at 588.
251
Id.
252
See UDHR, supra note 100; ICCPR, supra note 102; Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, supra note 247; GA Res. 58/4, supra note 248; Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Status of Ratification of the Convention, supra note 249; Ratification Status for Cuba, supra note 106.
253
See Brown & Greene, supra note 149.
245
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OECD Guidelines. This will provide some standardization for arbitrators who
may not be trained or well-versed in international human rights, and will
comport with soft-law initiatives that many investors have already adopted in
their own corporate credos.
Unfortunately, even if the Cuban government were to agree to the inclusion
of the four treaties they have ratified or even to some of the ICCPR principles
in a BIT, the BIT would still not bind investors to these terms. These investors
may perpetrate human rights abuses without recourse. Accordingly, below I
discuss a screening method for tribunals to ensure that corporate human rights
abusers do not receive the benefits of a BIT with the provisions outlined above.
E. The Clean Hands Doctrine as a Filter for Investors
Authors Dumberry and Dumas-Aubin recommend employing a “clean
hands doctrine,” defined as “an important principle of international law that
ha[s] to be taken into account whenever there [i]s evidence that an applicant
State ha[s] not acted in good faith and that it ha[s] come to court with unclean
hands.”254 Under the doctrine, a party cannot bring a claim if the party was
involved in an unlawful act in relation to its claim.255 Traditionally, arbitrators
employ the doctrine when the underlying BIT specifically requires compliance
with laws and regulations, and when principles of general international law
would allow for it.256
Dumbery and Dumas-Aubin acknowledge that the doctrine is controversial
and sparsely used, but they observe that many arbitral tribunals have declined a
case by an investor-claimant on jurisdictional grounds or have deemed a matter
inadmissible on the basis of illegal conduct such as bribery.257 Nonetheless,
they opine that disallowing claims should be a matter of admissibility of the
case rather than jurisdiction.258

254
Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, The Doctrine of ‘Clean Hands’ and the Inadmissibility
of Claims by Investors Breaching International Human Rights Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (Jan. 2013)
[hereinafter The Doctrine of ‘Clean Hands’]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 57th Session, ¶¶ 236,
U.N. Doc. A/60/10 (2005).
255
Mariano de Alba Uribe, Drawing the Line: Addressing Allegations of Unclean Hands in Investment
Arbitration 2 (May 30, 2015) (on file with author), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?
abstract_id=2612402 (citing ANDREW D. MITCHELL, M. SORNARAJAH & TANIA VOON, GOOD FAITH AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 29–30 (Oxford University Press, 2015)) (observing the adoption of the
doctrine’s underlying principles in various cases).
256
Id. at 6.
257
The Doctrine of ‘Clean Hands,’ supra note 254, at 1.
258
Id. at 10.
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I agree that investors who commit illegal conduct should not receive BIT
protection, and I would extend the ban to those investors who either commit
human rights violations or are complicit with the host state in human rights
abuses. A model BIT clause, adapted from the jurisdictional Article 18 of the
IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable
Development states:
Where an investor or its investment has breached any of the
obligations mentioned at Article . . . of this Agreement, neither the
investor nor its investment shall be entitled to the substantive
protections established under this Agreement. A host or home state
may raise these allegations as an objection to the admissibility in any
dispute under this Agreement.259

Corporate complicity with human rights abuses is a real risk in Cuba, thus
complicating the potential use of the doctrine. Further, in the case of Cuba and
the United States, it is unlikely that the host state of Cuba will raise human
rights issues on behalf of its people.
The United States, then, should require that an arbitrator receive proof of
“clean hands” and a lack of complicity with human rights abuses from the
investor claimant prior to admitting and adjudicating the case. As with the
TPP, the arbitrator should accept both public comments and amicus briefs from
stakeholders and those advocating for victims as relevant factors to ascertain
whether to adjudicate the claim.
I acknowledge that using the TPP as a model may spark controversy. The
TPP and its inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms has been
a sticking point for academics and politicians.260 Many object that the original
goal of protecting investors has been “hijacked” by speculators and hedge
funds who may buy companies solely to bring claims against host states when
those states enact reforms that hurt the company’s interests.261 Drafters of a
Cuba-U.S. BIT should take heed of this objection, but it should not derail its
inclusion.
259
Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 211, at 594 (citing art. 18(A) of the IISD Model International
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD), IISD Model Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (April 2005), available at
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf).
260
David Dayen & Ryan Grim, There’s a New Front in the Battle over the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/tpp-isds-battle_us_57d030cee4b06
a74c9f1da0c?section=&; see also 220+ Law and Economics Professors Urge Congress to Reject the TPP and
Other Prospective Deals That Include Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 7,
2016), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/ISDSletter.pdf.
261
Dayen & Grim, supra note 260.
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Admittedly, my proposal has additional obstacles particularly regarding the
definition of “human rights.” Although evidence of bribery clearly suffices to
bar admissibility, an NGO could argue that paying a Cuban worker in
accordance with Cuban law or not allowing unions constitute labor violations,
and could thereby argue to prohibit the arbitration. I would counter that a
tribunal could accept such a submission but that complying with Cuban law on
wages would not rise to the level of a human rights abuse. The Cuban
government has already begun relaxing some of the wage rules related to
foreign employees, and the U.S. government should work independently on
encouraging liberalization of those rules. Further, I contend that if the U.S.
firm treats its workers with respect and dignity, the ability to organize will be
less of an issue.
As a threshold measure, I would recommend that a tribunal consult with
the parties about amicus submissions and seriously consider submissions by
credible NGOs or other stakeholder representatives that support or discredit the
investor’s human rights records in Cuba, particularly if the investor and Cuba
are complicit in human rights abuses. To be clear, the onus is on the parties
themselves to prove that they have “clean hands.” Under my proposal, the
tribunal can, and should, accept evidence that contradicts or supports the
parties’ assertions.
In addition to the “clean hands” rule, other options include allowing the
host state to offset damages based on human rights violations and allowing
counterclaims by the host state which would allow it to raise violations.262
These options may pose some risks, though, because the Cuban government
may not invoke the protection if they themselves have violated human rights.
Therefore, the clean hands doctrine provides the best filter for screening
out cases that do not deserve BIT protection. However, although the inclusion
of human rights in BITs and the clean hands doctrine provide a small but
meaningful starting point, the U.S. government must consider investment more
holistically. National Action Plans under the UNGP provide the perfect vehicle
to accomplish that goal.
F. The Role of National Action Plans
On September 24, 2014, President Obama announced a new initiative, the
U.S. National Action Plan (“NAP”) on Responsible Business Conduct

262

The Doctrine of ‘Clean Hands,’ supra note 254.
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“consistent with the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.”263 According to the U.N. Working Group, an NAP is “[a]n
evolving policy strategy developed by a State to protect against adverse human
rights impacts by business enterprises in conformity with the UN Guiding
Principles. . . .”264 As of the time of this writing, seventeen countries have
released an NAP and thirty-two more have either begun development or are
completing them.265 The U.S. released its NAP in December 2016.266 Initially,
the U.S. NAP promised to address human rights, labor rights, trade and
investment, transparency and anti-corruption, procurement, and land and
agriculture.267 Unfortunately, it fell far short of expectations because it
proposed no new law but, rather, builds on existing laws, although it does use
the hammer of the federal government’s vast procurement power. More
importantly, it fails to include any concrete policies regarding investment.268
The NAP does provide five broad areas in which the U.S. government hopes to
spur responsible business conduct: (1) leading by example; (2) collaborating
with stakeholders; (3) facilitating responsible business conduct by companies;
(4) recognizing positive performance; and (5) providing access to remedy.269
For each category, the NAP describes the “new actions” that the government is
implementing, as well as the “ongoing commitments and initiatives.” Some of
the specific initiatives include: (1) a peer review process to enhance access to
remedy through the OECD complaint process; (2) stronger enforcement of
existing laws related to forced labor and convict labor; (3) a best practices list
related to sustainability that the government will use in the procurement
process; (4) the designation of “labor compliance advisors” for federal
contractors; and (5) more support for voluntary reporting on responsible
business conduct by publicly recognizing the effort of compliant companies.270
Unfortunately, for the purposes of this Article, the government missed a
golden opportunity to require companies to prioritize responsible business

263
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT: FIRST NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2007), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265918.pdf [hereinafter
First National Action Plan]; see also U.N. Working Grp. on Bus. and Human Rights, Guidance on National
Action Plans on Business and Human Rights (Nov. 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Business/UNWG_NAPGuidance.pdf. The Working Group published an initial version of its Guidance in
December 2014 and then published a new version in November 2016. Id. at 1.
264
First National Action Plan, supra note 263, at 3; see also State National Action Plans, supra note 34.
265
See State National Action Plans, supra note 34.
266
First National Action Plan, supra note 263.
267
Id.
268
See State National Action Plans, supra note 34.
269
Id.
270
Id.
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conduct via investment financing. Instead, the NAP provides the following
vague statement:
Enhancing Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
and Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)
Standards: OPIC and EXIM will enhance existing procedures and
standards that require companies receiving their support to
implement RBC principles. OPIC is reviewing its Environmental and
Social Policy Statement, while EXIM has developed an improved
mechanism for interested parties to provide comments, complaints,
or suggestions on the environmental and social consequences of its
pending and currently approved transactions, including reviewing
ways to improve the new portal for online submission.

Although the effort to use its procurement leverage is commendable, the
United States should have “led by example” in the investment finance context
precisely because the tie between human rights and investment is so important.
In fact, increasingly, a number of other states have begun to focus on
investment and human rights through their NAPs. The United States, therefore,
should follow their examples and revise its December 2016 NAP.
The United States could, for instance, look to the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom launched its NAP in September 2013.271 That NAP’s policies
regarding investment-specific action items include: (1) obtaining G8 support
for responsible business investment in Myanmar in line with the UNGPs; (2)
implementing human rights requirements in government procurement of
goods, works, and services; (3) including a requirement under the OECD 2012
Common Approaches for Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) to take into account
“relevant adverse project-related human rights impacts” and requiring ECAs to
“consider any statements or reports made publicly available by their National
Contact Points” so that negative NCP reports will be taken into account when
considering a project for export credit; (4) playing a key role in development of
the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
(ICOC); (5) reviewing business activity in conflict and fragile states; and (6)
continuing to provide financial support to the Compact.272 The United
Kingdom has also pledged to work with other countries to promote NAPs.273

271
See HM GOV’T, IMPLEMENTING THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901/BHR_Action_
Plan_-_final_online_version_1_.pdf.
272
Id.
273
Id.
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The Netherlands NAP, also introduced in 2013, has even stronger
language, making it clear that:
The government is committed to including clear provisions on the
relationship between trade, investment and sustainability in trade and
investment agreements. Within the EU, the Netherlands urges the
inclusion in these agreements of a section on trade and sustainable
development, with monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. . . . The
EU’s aim is for every trade agreement to be linked to a broader
partnership and cooperation agreement reaffirming states’ human
rights obligations. Where human rights are abused, the trade
agreement could ultimately be suspended.274

Italy’s NAP discusses investment in general but does not focus on bilateral
investment treaties.275 In contrast to the U.S. statement regarding export credit
and investment vehicles, Italy does, however, note that:
Export Credit Agencies and Investment Insurance Agencies (ECAs)
provide government-backed loans, insurance and guarantees to
support business enterprises industrial projects abroad, especially
with regard to complex and risky environment. The strategic role of
these public agencies (SACE and SIMEST) make them more exposed
to the risk of being associated or linked with human rights
infringement: they both apply the OECD Recommendation on
Common Approaches and Environmental Due Diligence and conduct
risk analysis on environmental and social impact in their
operations.276

Norway’s NAP277 is similarly instructive because it explicitly states that
the government will “[s]eek to ensure that provisions on respect for human
rights, including on safeguarding labour rights and working conditions, are
included in bilateral free trade agreements and investment treaties.”278
The United States can, and should, re-write its NAP using the examples
above for guidance regarding investment—an area in which it clearly fails. The
274
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013),
https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/netherlands-national-action-plan.pdf.
275
The Foundations of the Italian Action Plan on The United Nations “Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights,” U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Business/NationalPlans/NationalPlanActionItaly.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
276
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT’L COOPERATION, ITALIAN NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (2016), http://www.cidu.esteri.it/resource/2016/12/49117_f_NAPBHREN
GFINALEDEC152017.pdf (emphasis added).
277
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 274.
278
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, National Action Plan on Business and Human
Rights (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/business_hr/id2457726/.
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U.S. NAP fails in another aspect. Under the UNGPs, states and companies
must also provide governmental and nongovernmental access to remedy, and
the U.S. NAP provides no incentives or penalties for companies in this regard.
Adopting the “clean hands” filter for investment dispute resolution and
providing stakeholders the opportunity will help fulfill this UNGP mandate.
Because BITs do not traditionally accord community members the opportunity
to be heard, this provides some access to an impartial tribunal. This is
particularly important in Cuba given the potential for corporate complicity in
human rights abuses.
In sum, the United States clearly has a number of models from which to
choose and should strive to raise the bar when it comes to the integration of
human rights requirements into investment strategy. If and when the
government works to increase trade with Cuba, my recommendations for
drafting a BIT and my proposed revisions to the NAP provides two
opportunities to do so.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. embargo remains in effect notwithstanding the efforts by the
Obama administration to chip away at the restrictions. During this “thaw,” or
“deshielo,” and during the Trump administration’s increased pressure on the
Castro regime, the U.S. government can, and should, require more from Cuba
and U.S. businesses regarding human rights prior to lifting the embargo
completely. Although advocacy groups,279 members of Congress,280 and the
United Nations281 support lifting the embargo immediately, I support lifting it
with caveats, in keeping with the policy behind the UNGPs.
However, prior to lifting the embargo, the United States needs to examine
its own record on human rights and how it treats other violators, otherwise it
will have no credibility with the Cuban government. The U.S. Congress
demands human rights reform in Cuba but has not been consistent in its own
279
Megan R. Wilson & Vicki Needham, Business Believes US Embargo on Cuba to Crumble, THE HILL
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Embargo, One State at a Time, FOX NEWS LATINO (Mar. 31, 2016), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/
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business dealings with other authoritarian or socialist regimes. For example,
although the U.S. Department of State has criticized Cuba’s human rights
record, China, another communist country with a poor human rights record,282
is the United States’ third-largest trading partner.283 The United States lifted its
trade embargo with Communist Vietnam twenty years ago, and major U.S.
companies now operate there today even though the U.S. government has
leveled some of the same human rights criticism against Vietnam as it has
against Cuba.284 The communist government of Laos did not fare much better
than Cuba in human rights state department reports, but the U.S. government
actively promotes potential investment opportunities there.285
This inconsistency in approach to human rights violators diminishes the
U.S. government’s integrity in negotiating with Cuba. Tellingly, in its 2017
World Report, Human Rights Watch, a respected NGO, warned of the dangers
of the Trump administration from a human rights perspective.286 This hardly
puts the U.S. in a strong bargaining position with Cuba when discussing the
conditions on lifting the embargo.
But the United States can, and should, lift the embargo, keeping in mind
the human rights of the Cuban people. The U.S. government will not force the
Cuban government to make drastic differences in its understanding of or
respect for human rights. Perhaps Congress should amend or repeal
LIBERTAD, something beyond the scope of this Article.
The U.S. government can ensure that U.S. investors do not exacerbate
suffering in Cuba through its investment trade policy. Accordingly, any CubaU.S. BIT must include specific human rights language and should incorporate
a clean hands doctrine so that companies that are complicit in or perpetuate
human rights abuses will not get the benefit of the already favorable investorstate dispute resolution protection. As a former member of the U.N. Human
Rights Council that unanimously endorsed the UNGPs, Cuba should agree to
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terms that require the state and TNCs to protect and respect human rights. The
U.S. government should also entrench these ideals in a revised NAP.
Cuba and the United States sit ninety miles away from each other but have
spent over fifty years in a stalemate over human rights. The embargo, or
“blockade” as the United Nations and other nations label it, has caused
economic harm to the Castro regime that allows Cuba’s leaders to deflect from
the shortcomings of its own socialist system. But now that the deshielo has
begun, it is time for both nations to come to an acceptable agreement on a
workable definition of human rights to ensure the protection of both investor
and stakeholder interests.

